

# **NAHT evidence submission to the School Teachers' Review Body's (STRB) 34<sup>th</sup> remit**

**February 2024**

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## **Annexes**

The following document referred to in the text of this text is attached to this submission for the reference of the Review Body.

*Crisis Point*, NAHT, December 2023

## About NAHT

1. NAHT welcomes the opportunity to submit evidence to the School Teachers' Review Body (STRB) to inform its 34<sup>th</sup> remit report.
2. NAHT is the UK's largest professional trade union for school leaders. We represent more than 37,500 head teachers, executive heads, CEOs, deputy and assistant heads, vice principals and school business leaders. Our members work across: the early years, primary, special and secondary schools; independent schools; sixth form and FE colleges; outdoor education centres; pupil referral units, social services establishments and other educational settings.
3. In addition to the representation, advice and training that we provide for existing school leaders, we also support, develop and represent the school leaders of the future, through the middle leadership section of our association. We use our voice at the highest levels of government to influence policy for the benefit of leaders and learners everywhere.

## The structure of this submission

4. This submission sets out why investment is needed to deliver a major correction to the relative and real terms pay of school leaders and teachers in order to ensure teaching can both compete in the graduate market place and retain serving professionals. In section 1 we set out NAHT's pay expectations for 2024.
5. Section 2 provides an executive summary, followed by a detailed examination of the need to tackle pay deterioration that has undermined competitiveness by eroding the relative and real terms value of salaries. We also highlight the real terms cuts to the pay of school business leaders and outline the ongoing impact of real terms cuts on pension accruals (salary forgone).
6. Section 3 explains why 'affordability' criteria must not be used to fetter the Review Body's work and sets out why it is impossible for the STRB to make determinations about the impact of a pay uplift on the cost pressures facing schools.
7. Section 4 provides a comprehensive review of state of the nation leadership supply indicators, including NAHT's latest research. We also consider teacher supply, recruitment to teacher training, and supply from overseas to provide a comprehensive analysis of the ongoing recruitment and retention crisis.
8. Section 5 considers the DfE's continued failure to meet its public sector equality duty in relation to pay, updates NAHT's gender pay gap analysis and explains why so-called 'targeted' remuneration would create further pay detriment to those with protected characteristics, exacerbate existing inequalities and aggravate the ongoing supply crisis.

## Section 1 NAHT's pay expectations for 2024

10. In this section we set out NAHT's reasonable expectations for the 2024 pay award.
11. In subsequent sections we evidence the case for these necessary improvements.
12. NAHT urges the STRB to recommend a **major correction** to teaching professionals' pay through an undifferentiated, fully funded uplift to all salaries and allowances in payment from September 2024.
13. To be effective this uplift **must**:
  - improve the competitiveness of teaching professionals' pay against earnings in the wider economy by delivering an uplift **higher** than average pay settlements across the whole economy

**and**

  - be **higher** than the annual CPI inflation rate recorded for 2023 of 7.3% (unless monthly measures of inflation rise above this level between now and September)

**and**

  - contain an additional element to begin restoration of the real terms value of teachers' and school leaders' pay against losses caused by below inflation uplifts since 2010.
14. **For the avoidance of doubt, the uplift required to signal change to the profession will need to be in double digits.**
15. This would
  - improve the **competitiveness** of teaching in the graduate market place, and help to retain serving teachers and leaders
  - **protect** the current salaries of teachers and school leaders in real terms against further erosion by inflation
  - begin the **restoration** of teachers' and leaders' salaries to their 2010 value, signalling a course that could be completed within the life of the next parliament.
16. Once again, NAHT's proposal is not for a pay 'increase'. Rather it simply seeks the necessary improvements to **protect** current salaries against inflation, **improve** pay competitiveness, and **restore** the value of pay to 2010 levels.
17. It is critical that the STRB understands that **any** recommendation that falls below current inflation or prevailing pay settlements will only deepen the supply crisis. School leaders have been relentlessly reasonable for over a decade, but many

are now voting with their feet, after years of pay austerity.

18. We emphasise again that any reduction in the *rate* of current inflation merely indicates that prices are increasing at a slower rate. Should the rate by which prices are increasing abate, previous inflation, and the detriment to salaries caused by over a decade of below inflation uplifts, remain baked in.

19. It is imperative that the Review Body:

- takes action to make both teaching and leadership more competitive
- takes full account of the impact of historic pay erosion and current inflation when making recommendations on the next pay award
- impresses on government the importance of delivering a **fully funded** pay award - recognising that the STRB is in no position to make judgements about individual schools' cost pressures.

20. Following the general election, NAHT calls for a clear action plan and timeframe to resolve the longstanding issues that result from the current broken and dysfunctional pay system, and restates required system changes, including:

- a reformed national pay structure with mandatory minimum pay points and pay portability
- a comprehensive review of the factors that determine leadership pay
- a professional pay continuum that supports new career pathways and delivers pay progression for teachers and school leaders
- codification of executive leadership roles within a revised STPCD, and inclusion or alignment of school business leader roles within the leadership pay range
- comprehensive analysis of the gender pay gap and determined actions to eliminate pay gaps for all protected characteristics to ensure pay equality and equity
- protected leadership time for assistant and deputy head teachers, and head teachers of small schools
- promotion of genuinely flexible approaches to working, such as phased retirement options
- establishment of a range of 'key worker' packages
- a system that delivers timely pay uplifts
- commitment to full funding of future pay uplifts
- a statement on reasonably expected working hours for leaders.

## Section 2 Pay deterioration

### 2.1 Executive summary

*Investment is needed to proactively manage the worsening recruitment position and declining competitiveness of teacher pay. It will be more cost-effective to act sooner rather than later. The cost of failure is high: it affects teaching quality and adversely impacts on children's education.*

School Teachers' Review Body, 2023<sup>1</sup>

21. The Review Body's 33<sup>rd</sup> report represented a significant **initial** step forward. Its conclusion that pay lies at the heart of any effort to secure teacher and leadership supply provided an unequivocal steer to the Department for Education, the Treasury and wider government – **pay matters**.
22. More than a decade of below inflation pay uplifts have eroded both the real value of teachers' and leaders' salaries and undermined the relative attractiveness of a career in teaching, as the competitiveness of salaries has declined.
23. The 33<sup>rd</sup> report accepted that teaching professionals' salaries had fallen well behind other graduate occupations. It noted that a 14.5% rise in graduate recruitment was accompanied by half of all graduate employers increasing their starting salaries by 10%. Private sector earnings grew at a much faster rate than the earnings of teaching professionals, as *relative* earnings for teachers and school leaders fell by 10%.<sup>2</sup>
24. The STRB noted that over a range of different comparators, the competitiveness of teachers' and leaders' pay had fallen 'markedly over a number of years' by comparison to the whole economy, the wider public sector and other professional occupations.<sup>3</sup>
25. The supply of teachers and leaders is now in such serious free fall that the Review Body **correctly** drew the conclusion that '**there is almost no area where recruitment is sufficient**,' leading it to recommend that the 'priority [was] correcting the general deterioration in teachers' pay.'<sup>4</sup> NAHT agreed.
26. The delivery of a 6.5% uplift to pay was welcome, but this did not provide the **major correction** needed for teachers' and leaders' pay. In fact, with CPI inflation running at 6.7% in September 2023,<sup>5</sup> the uplift that the Secretary of State described as 'historic'<sup>6</sup> once again failed to prevent a further deterioration in the real terms value of salaries.

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<sup>1</sup> STRB 33<sup>rd</sup> report, 2023, p 1

<sup>2</sup> STRB 33<sup>rd</sup> report, 2023, p 16

<sup>3</sup> STRB 33<sup>rd</sup> report, 2023, p 16

<sup>4</sup> STRB 33<sup>rd</sup> report, 2023, p 23

<sup>5</sup> Consumer price inflation, UK September 2023, NAO

<sup>6</sup> Gillian Keegan's letter to Mike Aldred, 20 December 2023

27. Moreover, teaching salaries **deteriorated against other workers'** earnings. For the period August to October 2023, the annual growth in average weekly earnings was 6.9% for the public sector, the highest since comparable records began in 2001, and 7.3% for the private sector.
28. Despite the uplift, the competitiveness of teachers' and leaders' pay declined in the graduate market place,<sup>7</sup> and the ongoing and longstanding pay erosion, which has rendered teaching unattractive to high quality applicants, continued.
29. Overwhelming evidence confirms that the supply crisis affects recruitment and retention equally. It is not limited to a failure of the 'market' in a handful of areas or subjects. The crisis is evident across all almost all subjects, across all geographical areas, phases and specialisms, and affects aspiration to lead and leadership retention. The notion that such deep seated problems can be resolved through flattening pay or targeting uplifts is unquestionably wrong.
30. Below, we demonstrate how the deterioration of pay has made teaching and leadership salaries **uncompetitive**.
31. Necessarily, this impacts the recruitment of recent graduates and 'career changers', who increasingly see a teaching as an unattractive long-term occupation, with little prospect of meaningful pay progression, while crushing workload and the high risk of workplace related stress and ill-health act as powerful disincentives. For those looking for a mortgage, a good standard of living, and protection against rising prices, teaching doesn't look well placed to deliver.
32. Government, Treasury and DfE have compounded these problems through their persistent refusal to act to **retain** teachers and leaders who are already in service. Instead, ministers continue to pursue policies that undermine pay progression and leadership aspiration, and act as tipping points for those considering leaving the profession.
33. Armed with the knowledge that there has been no substantive improvement in England's extraordinary wastage rates; that the spiralling decline in leadership aspiration is worsening year on year; that more and more teachers and leaders are taking actuarially reduced retirement at 55, and that England already has one of the least experienced teaching workforces among the OECD nations, ministers have focused on policies that can, at best, be described as ephemera.
34. These include exhortations to develop flexible working for fundamentally inflexible roles; undermining pay progression through so-called pay flattening; an ideologically driven approach to early career support that increases rather than reduces workload; a refusal to accept the ongoing health impacts and workforce damage associated with an unreliable and unsafe inspection system; and the misplaced assumption that ministers should determine pedagogical approaches for trained professionals.

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<sup>7</sup> [Average weekly earnings in Great Britain](#): December 2023, NAO



35. Instead of addressing the deterioration in relative and real terms pay, government is desperately trying to fill the gaps in the teacher and leader workforce through sticking plaster solutions and policy gimmicks.
36. These schemes include introducing risks to teacher quality by seeking to recruit from a pool of unsuitable overseas candidates (see below) and undermining graduate entry requirements through the development of a non-graduate entry route, rather than investing in the long term to recruit and retain a professional workforce. All of which is a far cry from Michael Gove's plans to emulate South Korea and Finland by recruiting teachers from the top 5% and 10% of graduates respectively.<sup>8</sup>
37. **This backdrop is important to the Review Body's consideration of the pay uplift for 2024.** It colours how serving teachers and leaders will make their career decisions. It acts as a disincentive to those thinking of a career in education.
38. Serving professionals are keenly aware that they bore the brunt of austerity, and that they continue to bear the brunt of politicians' ineffective, careless policies and abusive language; all of which has been compounded by a cost of living crisis that government has no grip on.
39. **Pay is an important counterweight.** Last year's Review Body report provided a glimmer of hope. Its clarity on the need to invest to make teaching a competitive and attractive career option, and the recommendation of a more realistic pay uplift, gave professionals some grounds for optimism. It is critical to build on this in the coming remit.
40. As ever, the Secretary of State's letter for this 34<sup>th</sup> remit made it abundantly clear that ministers have again set their faces against the Review Body's previous findings and recommendations. Once again, government and DfE have quite shamelessly deployed 'affordability' as a firewall against the overwhelming evidence that sustained investment is needed to arrest the deterioration of pay and tackle the supply crisis.
41. Government's 'through the looking glass' approach is best summed up by the frankly ridiculous assertion that the STRB should consider '**...cost pressures** that schools are **already** facing; **may** face over the coming year; and the effect of cost pressures on **individual schools**.'<sup>9</sup> [NAHT emphasis]
42. Indeed, the STRB has previously been clear it is difficult to make any meaningful assessment of **affordability** at a system-wide level, given the variation in schools' individual financial circumstances; that cost pressures are not synonymous with affordability; and that there is considerable autonomy within the school system.<sup>10</sup>
43. Of course, government does not *really* expect the STRB to consider cost pressures affecting more than 22,000 individual schools – its instruction is

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<sup>8</sup> [Government sets out plans to attract the best graduates into teaching](#), DfE, June 2011

<sup>9</sup> Gillian Keegan's letter to Mike Aldred, 20 December 2023

<sup>10</sup> [STRB 29<sup>th</sup> report](#), 2019, p x

intended to fetter the Review Body's core functions.

44. Government knows that any pay uplift must be fully funded if schools are to be able to balance their budgets without making staff redundant. However, it seeks to pose a false dichotomy where there is a trade-off between pay for the school workforce against funding for pupils. Education is predominately a 'people' business. Without the investment to recruit and retain high quality teaching professionals, schools are simply not able to meet pupils' needs.
45. This reveals the real 'cost pressure' that schools face. The overall quantum of school funding remains insufficient to recruit and retain teachers, insufficient to provide for pupils with additional and high needs, and insufficient to fix a decrepit school estate that is, quite literally, falling down.
46. Delivering government's ambitions for a world class education system is contingent on highly qualified, professionally experienced teachers and leaders, **and** the funding to recruit, retain and develop them. Government often intones that high pay in the private sector reflects quality; why then should the expectation in the public sector be any different?
47. This year, the Review Body must **go further** with recommendations to counter the structural deterioration of pay by rebuilding the competitiveness of teaching salaries compared to those in the wider economy, **and** taking concrete steps towards real terms pay restoration. As we demonstrate below, pay competitiveness and pay restoration are two sides of the same coin.
48. The STRB carries a weighty responsibility. It is not hyperbolic to assert that the Review Body's willingness to again exert its independence is **critical** to the future supply of teachers and leaders, and hence to the nation's children. The Review Body was correct to identify that the risk of failing to arrest the deterioration in pay is high, because this has a direct impact on teaching quality and leads to adverse impacts on children's education.<sup>11</sup> And it was correct in its assessment that 'additional investment is needed and [that] it will be more cost effective to act sooner rather than later'.<sup>12</sup>
49. Last year's report took an important step towards delivering the long overdue pay correction that will turn the tide on the supply crisis. This year what is needed is a solid, sensible and practical interim solution. NAHT urges the Review Body to remain **firmly fixed** on addressing the **structural deterioration** and **declining competitiveness** of teaching professionals' pay.
50. Formulations such as 'targeting remuneration to address particular workforce challenges',<sup>13</sup> have no place in this remit. The Review Body must have the confidence and independence to speak truth to government.
51. The forthcoming general election offers a **window of opportunity** for an incoming government, of whatever colour, to reset the relationship with the profession. Pay should sit high on a new Secretary of State's to do list – an

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<sup>11</sup> [STRB 33<sup>rd</sup> report](#), 2023, p 1

<sup>12</sup> [STRB 33<sup>rd</sup> report](#), 2023, p 22

<sup>13</sup> [STRB 33<sup>rd</sup> report](#), 2023, p 23

early commitment to reverse pay deterioration in salaries and design a new, fair pay structure would send an important signal to serving professionals and the wider labour market that a career in teaching will deliver appropriate reward.

52. But in the meantime, the Review Body's **unrelenting focus** must be on reversing the deterioration of teaching professionals' pay.
53. There must, of course, be swift decisive action on other drivers of attrition, beginning with full inspection reform to counter the wastage and negative health impacts driven by high stakes accountability.
54. No future government should be in any doubt that a key part of any strategy to resolve the recruitment and retention crisis is to counter pay deterioration and tackle real terms pay erosion.
55. The deterioration of teachers' and leaders' pay affects both the **relative value** of salaries, making teaching an uncompetitive occupation in relation to the wider jobs market, and their **real terms value** by effectively delivering a pay cut in real terms over time. **Both** affect supply. The case for investment is therefore **twofold**.

## 2.2 Pay competitiveness: the relative value of salaries

*I do think we have to pay teachers properly. I really do, we need a properly well-rewarded teaching profession... because if you struggle to recruit there's only one real answer"*

Nick Gibb, former schools minister, 3 December 2023<sup>14</sup>

56. Speaking to a newspaper in November 2023,<sup>15</sup> just three weeks after his resignation, former schools minister Nick Gibb broke ranks, stating that pay is 'the only real answer' in a sector which struggles to recruit and retain the teaching professionals that the nation's children need.
57. Having spent a decade as schools minister, overseeing a maelstrom of missed recruitment targets and failed attempts to stem teacher and leader attrition, Nick Gibb is perhaps uniquely placed to comment, but late to draw a conclusion.
58. During his time in government all manner of policy initiatives failed to move the dial on recruitment and retention, including the teacher training bursary programme which had gobbled up £1bn by as early as 2016.<sup>16</sup> To put that in perspective, £1bn would fund a pay uplift of around 4% for all teachers and leaders in service in this pay round.
59. Most others had long seen the folly of undermining teaching professionals' real terms pay, which became less and less attractive to those seeking a graduate career. Unsurprisingly, as pay deteriorated, teaching struggled to compete in an increasingly tight jobs market. Inflation spiked, reaching levels last seen in the 1990s, sending energy, insurance, mortgage and other unavoidable costs into the stratosphere. Plenty of reason, then, to consider other better paid careers, with less stress and workload.
60. A policy which allows the competitiveness of teaching professionals' pay to decline relative to earnings for workers with similar qualifications, and to workers in the wider economy, is bound to exacerbate existing supply issues. Yet that is exactly the outcome of the government's policy decisions since 2010.
61. The OECD makes clear that
- 'Education systems compete with other sectors of the economy to attract high-quality graduates as teachers. Research shows that salaries and the alternative opportunities available to these graduates are important factors in the attractiveness of teaching... Teachers' salaries relative to other occupations with similar education requirements, and their likely growth in earnings, may have a huge influence on a graduate's decision to become a teacher or to stay in the profession.'<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Quoted in [inews](#)

<sup>15</sup> Quoted in [inews](#)

<sup>16</sup> Reported in [Schools Week](#), 8 June 2016


<sup>17</sup> [Education at a glance](#), OECD, 2023, p 383

62. In July 2023 NfER observed that

‘The deteriorating competitiveness of teacher pay in England is likely to be one significant factor affecting supply. Teacher pay has grown more slowly than average earnings in the wider economy. The research evidence suggests that this loss of competitiveness is likely to have had a negative impact on recruitment and retention. The deteriorating competitiveness of teacher pay in England is likely to be one significant factor affecting supply.’<sup>18</sup>

63. The growth in teaching professionals’ salaries has become unmoored from wider average earnings. NfER found that teacher pay in nominal terms grew more slowly than average earnings in the wider economy. Between 2010/11 and 2022/23 average earnings increased by 39%, while average teacher salaries increased by just 16% - a yawning gap that has reduced the competitiveness of teaching salaries, as illustrated below.

**Figure 1: Teacher pay in England has grown more slowly than average earnings in the UK economy since 2010/11 and has therefore lost competitiveness**



Source: NfER analysis of ONS and DfE School Workforce in England data.

Source: NfER<sup>19</sup>

64. The STRB noted that the relative median value of teachers’ and leaders’ pay fell throughout the early 2010s, and that its competitiveness has continued to fall ‘markedly’. As a result, teachers’ and school leaders’ relative salaries are historically uncompetitive by comparison to the whole economy, the wider public sector and other professional occupations in England.<sup>20</sup>


65. NfER analysis also found a sharp decline in the real terms pay of experienced teachers and school leaders, meaning that their salaries also lost relative value as they were outstripped by the positive growth of average UK earnings, as can be seen in the chart below. This is a direct result of choosing to focus uplifts differentially on early career teachers, rather than lifting pay across the profession.

<sup>18</sup> [Policy options for a long-term teacher pay and financial incentive strategy](#), NfER, July 2023, p i

<sup>19</sup> [Policy options for a long-term teacher pay and financial incentive strategy](#), NfER, July 2023, p 2

<sup>20</sup> [STRB 33<sup>rd</sup> report](#), 2023, p 16

**Teachers pay is lower in real terms than in 2010/11 and has lost competitiveness relative to the wider economy over the last decade**



Source: Office for National Statistics (Series KAB9), Office for National Statistics (Series D7BT), School Teachers' Pay and Conditions Documents. Economic forecasts: Office for Budget Responsibility – Economic and Fiscal Outlook – November 2022. Teacher pay assumptions: STRB Thirty-Second Report.

Source: NfER, January 2023<sup>21</sup>

66. The downward trajectory of school leaders' pay undermines leadership aspiration. NAHT has repeatedly flagged that increased leadership responsibility must be underpinned by a significant salary uplift. The impact of falling real and relative leadership salaries are evidenced by NAHT's latest findings (see below) that more than six in ten (61%) assistant and deputy head teachers do not aspire to headship.

67. The 2023 pay award, while welcome, did not make teaching salaries *more* competitive. Instead, it prevented salaries from becoming even more *uncompetitive*. The key supply indicators (see below) do not inspire confidence that the 6.5% increase will be sufficient to prevent further damage to teacher and leadership supply. With CPI inflation running at 6.7% at the time of the award,<sup>22</sup> the welcome uplift did not tackle the deteriorating position of teaching professionals' salaries - they continued to deteriorate, but at a slower rate.


68. This year, NAHT's annual survey of school leaders identifies pay as the second most important factor for government to act upon if it is to improve the attractiveness of school leadership, selected by almost three quarters (72%) of respondents (see chart below). Once a fifth or sixth order issue, pay is now a key source of dissatisfaction among leaders, acting as both a disincentive to further promotion and the tipping point for those considering leaving the profession entirely.

(Continued overleaf...)

<sup>21</sup> Short supply: addressing the post pandemic teacher supply challenge in England, NfER, January 2023, p 29

<sup>22</sup> Consumer price inflation, UK September 2023, NAO


What could improve the attractiveness of school leadership?



Source: Crisis Point, NAHT December 2023<sup>23</sup>

69. As explained above, the competitiveness of teaching professionals' salaries lags behind those of their counterparts in the public sector. And public sector workers' total average weekly earnings in turn lag behind earnings both in the private sector and for the whole economy, even as earnings growth has begun to slow, as the rate by which prices are rising has eased.

Total average weekly earnings, November 2020 to November 2023



Source: ONS


Source: Incomes Data Research

70. For the period August to October 2023, the annual growth in average weekly earnings was 6.9% for the public sector, the highest since comparable records began in 2001, and 7.3% for the private sector. Once again, teachers' and

<sup>23</sup> Crisis Point, NAHT, 2023, p 3

leaders' pay fell behind, becoming less competitive in the graduate market place.<sup>24</sup>

71. The latest available data provides further evidence of ongoing pay deterioration, showing that teachers' and leaders' pay continues to lose ground. Growth in regular pay for the whole economy remained at 6.6% in November's data, with both public and private sector growth at 6.5% - a clear indicator that the Review Body must recommend an inflation plus pay uplift if there is to be any progress in making teaching professionals' pay more competitive.<sup>25</sup>
72. Other analysis confirms this picture. XpertHR found that in the three months to December 2023 the whole economy median pay settlement stood at 6%, with the median public sector settlement being higher than both the private and whole economy settlement rate.



Source: XpertHR pay databank.

Source: XpertHR<sup>26</sup>

73. Overall, pay settlements were well below the rate of consumer price inflation until October 2023, when, as the rate of inflation fell, the headline pay award for the wider economy finally outstripped inflation for the first time since April 2021. The expectation in the wider economy is that the gap between pay settlements and inflation will narrow in 2024, but the CPI inflation measure will remain well above the bank of England's 2% target, which is likely to be reflected in pay settlements.<sup>27</sup>
74. Below inflation uplifts have been a key driver fuelling the deterioration and lack of competitiveness of teachers' and leaders' pay for more than a decade.

<sup>24</sup> [Average weekly earnings in Great Britain: December 2023](#), NAO

<sup>25</sup> [Average earnings growth slows in most sectors](#), Incomes Data Research, 16 January 2024

<sup>26</sup> [Pay Trends January 2024: A first look at new deals](#), Paula Flores, XpertHR, January 2024

<sup>27</sup> [Pay Trends January 2024: A first look at new deals](#), Paula Flores, XpertHR, January 2024




75. The **annual** rate of CPI inflation rose from 2.6% in 2021 to 9.1% in 2022,<sup>28</sup> outstripping the 2022 and 2023 pay awards. The impact of inflation rates of over 9.0% from April 2022 to March 2023, with eight months at 10%+ and a peak of 11.1%, has been baked in, adding further pressure on already uncompetitive salaries.<sup>29</sup>

76. Other cost drivers are likely to influence pay settlements in the coming pay round. The rise in bank base rates is set to deliver further cost increases of some £19bn, with up to 1.5 million households estimated to remortgage in 2024 as their existing mortgage deals come to an end. The Resolution Foundation estimates annual cost increases of about £1,800 for a typical family.<sup>30</sup>

### Mortgage payments will increase for many households


Number of owner-occupied mortgages that will experience increases in monthly mortgage costs. For end 2024 and end 2026 relative to 2023 Q2



Guardian graphic. Source: Bank of England Financial Stability Report, FCA product sales data and bank calculations

Source: The Guardian<sup>31</sup>

77. Higher energy, food and other related costs mean that teachers' and leaders' salaries remain under sustained pressure at a time when household finances are still reeling from recent sustained high inflation, with prices still rising. The 2023 uplift must therefore be seen in the context of the **7.3% annual rate of CPI inflation for 2023**, well above the 6.5% pay award, delivering another real terms cut.



Source: National Audit Office<sup>32</sup>

<sup>28</sup> [CPI annual rate](#), NAO

<sup>29</sup> [Consumer price inflation, UK statistical series](#), NAO

<sup>30</sup> Reported in [The Guardian](#), 4 January 2024


<sup>31</sup> [The Guardian](#), 4 January 2024

<sup>32</sup> [CPI annual rate](#), NAO, 17 January 2024

### 2.3 Pay erosion: the real terms value of salaries

*'People in education are very humble about what they do. They are those unsung heroes who quietly go about their job every day for the good of the children, that's who we are, that's why most of us came into teaching. But when the odds are stacked against you day after day it is impossible.'*

Assistant head teacher, London



Source: NAHT analysis of leaders' real terms pay loss, based on the L1 pay point<sup>33</sup>

78. The chart above shows the devastating impact of below inflation uplifts on the purchasing power of salaries. Since 2010 school leaders' salaries have lost a fifth (20%) of their real terms value when measured against CPI inflation. This has **directly** undermined the competitiveness and attractiveness of leadership roles.


79. The detriment to salaries rises to more than a third (38.9%) of their real terms value if compared against RPI inflation.

80. The chart below, compares the actual value of the L1 salary point of the leadership pay range, with its value adjusted for CPI inflation. NAHT's analysis illustrates the yawning real terms gap that has been developed directly as a result of government's pay freeze, caps and 'affordability' policies.

(Continued overleaf...)

<sup>33</sup> Using NAO consumer price data

**Comparison for point L1 of actual pay against pay adjusted by annual CPI inflation**



Source: NAHT analysis of leaders' real terms pay loss, based on the L1 pay point

81. The table below illustrates the impact of those policies on two specific salary points on the leadership pay scale. It shows the real terms losses for point L7 (around the median salary for an assistant or deputy head teacher) and point L20 (the median salary for a primary phase head teacher) against CPI inflation since 2010.

<b>Real terms loss to points L7 &amp; L20 of the leadership pay scale since 2010</b>			
Salary point	Uplift required to restore 2023-24 salary its 2010 value in real terms	Increase in real terms loss between 2022-23 and 2023-24	Mean average annual real terms loss to salary point <i>each year</i> since 2010
L7	£11,588	£1,759	£6,145
L20	£15,060	£1,552	£8,383

**Source:** NAHT analysis comparing annual uplifts to L7 and L20 pay points against ONS CPI inflation data, figures are rounded

(Continued overleaf...)

82. To **restore** the L7 salary to its 2010 value in real terms would require an uplift of £11,588 this year.<sup>34</sup>

- In a single year, between 2022-23 and 2023-24, the real terms loss to the annual L7 salary **increased** by £1,759 (from £9,829 to £11,588).
- On **average** the L7 salary point has lost £6,145 in its real terms value each year since 2010.<sup>35</sup>

83. To **restore** the L20 salary to its 2010 value in real terms would require an uplift of £15,060 this year.<sup>36</sup>

- In a single year, between 2022-23 and 2023-24, the real terms loss to the annual L20 salary **increased** by £1,552 (from £13,508 to £15,060).
- On **average** the L20 salary point has lost £8,383 in its real terms value each year since 2010.<sup>37</sup>

84. For completeness, NAHT **again** provides a time series for the L1 pay point that evidences the real terms erosion of leaders' pay, illustrating the impact on leaders' pay of below inflation uplifts.

85. The updated table below tracks the real terms leadership salary losses against both CPI and RPI inflation between 2010 and 2023. The erosion of all other pay points on the leadership pay scale is on a similar scale for each year of the series.

86. The table shows the actual minimum salary on the leadership pay range each year from 2010 onwards; the annual CPI and RPI rates by year (based on NAO data); and what the minimum salary would have been, had it been uplifted annually to keep pace with CPI and also RPI inflation rates.

87. The effect of doing so would have been to preserve, **but not increase**, the value of school leaders' salaries against inflation – so that the purchasing power of salaries remained constant.

88. Since 2010, in percentage terms, the real terms value of a school leaders' salary has suffered an effective cut of about

- 20% against CPI inflation
- 38.9% against RPI inflation.

(Continued overleaf...)

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<sup>34</sup>Calculations are against CPI inflation

<sup>35</sup> NAHT analysis of annual real terms salary loss to the L7 point 2010 – 2023 against NAO annual CPI data, figures are rounded

<sup>36</sup>Calculations are against CPI inflation

<sup>37</sup> NAHT analysis of annual real terms salary loss to the L7 point 2010 – 2023 against NAO annual CPI data, figures are rounded

	Minimum salary pay point on the leadership scale	Average annual CPI	Pay point adjusted by CPI	Difference to actual pay point (reduction in real terms against CPI since 2010)	Average annual RPI	Pay point adjusted by RPI	Difference to actual pay point (reduction in real terms against RPI since 2010)
2010	£37,461	3.3%	£38,697	3%	4.6%	£39,184	5%
2011	£37,461	4.5%	£40,439	8%	5.2%	£41,222	10%
2012	£37,461	2.8%	£41,571	11%	3.2%	£42,541	14%
2013	£37,836	2.6%	£42,652	13%	3.0%	£43,817	16%
2014	£38,215	1.5%	£43,291	13%	2.4%	£44,869	17%
2015	£38,598	0.0%	£43,291	12%	1.0%	£45,317	17%
2016	£38,984	0.7%	£43,595	12%	1.8%	£46,133	18%
2017	£39,374	2.7%	£44,772	14%	3.6%	£47,794	21%
2018	£39,965	2.5%	£45,891	15%	3.3%	£49,371	24%
2019	£41,065	1.8%	£46,717	14%	2.6%	£50,655	23%
2020	£42,195	0.9%	£47,137	12%	1.5%	£51,415	22%
2021	£42,195	2.6%	£48,363	15%	4.1%	£53,523	27%
2022	£44,305	9.1%	£52,764	19%	11.6%	£59,731	35%
<b>2023</b>	<b>£47,185</b>	<b>7.3%</b>	<b>£56,616</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>9.7%</b>	<b>£65,525</b>	<b>38.9%</b>

Source: NAHT analysis comparing the L1 salary point against ONS annual inflation data

89. During this time government also imposed a number of lower uplifts for leaders, reducing the differential for leaders and (also for experienced teachers), undermining pay progression.
90. As a result of these short-sighted policies, the salary differential between upper pay range point 3 (£46,525) and the minimum point on the leadership pay range (£47,185) is now **just £660** per annum.
91. **This is a strong disincentive to leadership.** Why would a teacher take on the risk of the weighty responsibility and accountability of a senior school leadership role for around £55 a month **before** tax, national insurance, pension and student loan deductions? After deductions this would not fund the purchase of a family takeaway.
92. For far too long government's approach to resolving supply issues has focused mainly on incentives to persuade recent graduates and career changers to commit to a course of teacher training (mainly through the use of inducements such as bursaries) and the belated implementation of a £30,000 starting salary for teachers outside London, first announced in 2019 and finally achieved four years later in 2023.

93. While it is certainly true that higher starting salaries form an important part of any strategy to secure teacher and leader supply, ministers' stubborn refusal to take steps to improve **teacher and leadership retention** have undoubtedly exacerbated the supply crisis.
94. In recent years government has followed policy seemingly calibrated to **undermine retention** including differential pay uplifts that favoured new starters over experienced professionals, and persistently seeking to reduce the value of pay progression steps along the advisory pay ranges.
95. Uplifts to the M1 and M2 salary points, necessary to increase the starting salary for newly qualified teachers to £30,000, were also effectively funded by restricting and 'flattening' the salaries of experienced teachers and leaders.
96. This affects an individual's assessment of the likely growth of the future earnings acting both as a powerful disincentive to those considering a career in teaching, and as a push factor to those considering leaving the profession. These policies defy logic; more so when the competitiveness of the pay of teaching professionals in relation to the wider economy is declining.
97. The OECD makes the clear and uncontroversial point that 'low wages reduce the attractiveness of the teaching profession... competitive salaries are crucial to retaining teachers and attracting more individuals to the profession,' and observes that '...Low wage growth for teachers partly explains the gap between teachers' salaries and those of other tertiary-educated workers'<sup>38</sup>.
98. Ministers have yet to wake up to this. Instead, the oft repeated and patently incorrect belief within the corridors of the DfE is that the only pay point that matters is M1, the starting salary for new entrants.
99. The OECD offers helpful, if obvious, clarity for those willing to listen:
- 'Countries that are looking to increase the supply of teachers, especially those with an ageing teacher workforce or a growing school-age population, might consider offering more attractive starting wages and career prospects. **However, to ensure a well-qualified teaching workforce, efforts must be made not only to recruit and select the most competent and best-qualified teachers, but also to retain them.**'<sup>39</sup> [NAHT emphasis]
100. England has neither an increasing school-age population nor an ageing teacher workforce. Faced with the youngest, and therefore most inexperienced workforce in the OECD (see below), and a stampede of late career teachers and leaders seeking to take early retirement at 55 (see below), DfE and Treasury should be straining every sinew to retain them in order to stabilise the profession and support incoming cohorts of new teachers.
101. Pay is a key lever here, alongside policy innovation, including greater use of phased retirement, slashing class sizes and developing new career and (especially) late career pathways.

<sup>38</sup> [Education at a glance](#), OECD, 2023, p 385

<sup>39</sup> [Education at a glance](#), OECD, 2023, p 380

102. But the impact is also more widespread. Early career teachers weighing up whether to commit to teaching for the long term are more likely to conclude that salary progression is not commensurate with the level of responsibility and accountability expected of leaders, particularly given the extraordinary workload and health risks associated with these roles. Small wonder, then, that many choose to leave the profession for pastures new within the first five years.
103. NFER's call for a long-term strategy on pay and financial incentives reflects the continued deterioration in the competitiveness of teachers' and leaders' pay that has delivered the ongoing recruitment and retention crisis. Its key recommendation that '...pay uplifts [should be] higher than pay growth in the wider labour market'<sup>40</sup> is of particular relevance, given that overall pay growth continues to be strong in other occupations.
104. Improving the competitiveness of pay relative to the wider economy is critical. The 2024 pay round must deliver pay uplifts for teaching professionals that are market leading – ahead of pay growth in both the whole economy and the public and private sectors.
105. A growing consensus recognises that '...increasing average teacher pay faster than average earnings is likely to improve both teacher recruitment and retention...' because '...the lost competitiveness of teachers' pay is likely to be exacerbating both recruitment and retention challenges.'<sup>41</sup>
106. It really isn't rocket science. Allowing pay in one sector to fall behind the market **and** in real terms for over a decade will make that occupation unattractive to new entrants. Failing to tackle increasing real terms and relative detriment will mean that those working in the high stress, high workload school environment, and experiencing real terms pay cuts year after year at a time when the cost of living is skyrocketing, will be forced to look for alternative occupations to maintain their standard of living.
107. The inescapable conclusion is that the 2024 pay settlement for teachers and leaders **must** deliver a pay award that is **higher** than both the whole economy and public sector median rates, **and also** higher than inflation, if teaching professionals' salaries are to compete against other sectors. NAHT urges the Review Body to build on the recommendations contained in the 33<sup>rd</sup> report by delivering recommendations that provide a much-needed **major correction** to teachers' and leaders' pay.

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<sup>40</sup> Short supply: addressing the post pandemic teacher supply challenge in England, NFER, January 2023, p 3

<sup>41</sup> Short supply: addressing the post pandemic teacher supply challenge in England, NFER, January 2023, p 30

## 2.4 The pay and conditions of School Business Leaders

*'Obviously, people should be paid what they're worth  
and we should have pay rises in line with inflation'*

School Business Leader, North West

108. NAHT, once again, reiterates its longstanding call for the development of a pay structure for school business professionals that is aligned with the leadership pay range. This reflects the need for an integrated approach, so that leadership of pedagogy and management of learning is underpinned by efficient and effective leadership of the business aspects of a school or trust.
109. The Department itself recognises the 'vital role that business professionals play in ensuring pupils receive an outstanding education,' and the need to support these professionals 'to navigate the societal and technological changes, as well as continued structural changes to the school system,'<sup>42</sup> which will require an increasing level of specialised skills.
110. This chimes with our long-standing assertion, that the role of school business professionals has evolved, and its complexity has increased over the last decade, and therefore so too have the demands and skills required for the job. Again, the Department acknowledges this, through their support of the new revised Professional Standards for Business Professionals.<sup>43</sup>
111. This is also reflected in the qualifications and experience that many senior business professionals hold; and the fact that the majority of business leaders are a member of a school's senior leadership team and / or involved in strategic decision making<sup>44</sup>.
112. Yet the pay of many school business leaders continues to be determined by local government pay scale levels, either directly or indirectly as a benchmark figure. NAHT has highlighted numerous times in recent years that this offers insufficient flexibility to recognise the status and seniority of a school business leader (SBL) role, particularly for those carrying out senior leadership responsibilities within a school. Neither does it provide for account to be taken of the increasing scope and responsibility of SBL roles.
113. This has been most clearly demonstrated in the recent support staff pay awards. In 2023, pay for those covered by the school support staff pay scales (which includes many SBLs) was increased by a fixed £1,925\* (for full-time staff and pro-rata for part-time). The flat rate nature of the award meant that those at the top-end of the scale received a far smaller percentage uplift of as little as 3.88%. This narrows the pay scale (such as it is) undermining leadership aspiration and the salary differential for leadership responsibility.
114. It cannot be right that leaders who have responsibility for extremely complex business functions in schools, with very significant legal, financial and safety

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<sup>42</sup> [DfE external document template \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](#)

<sup>43</sup> [DfE external document template \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](#)

<sup>44</sup> [Survey of school and trust business professionals \(publishing.service.gov.uk\)](#)



accountabilities, are not entitled to comparable remuneration to their colleagues who exercise similar accountability and responsibility for work focused on teaching, learning and behaviour.

115. Consideration of the workload of 'teaching' leaders and head teachers is directly related to the workload of school business leaders. The already pronounced difficulties in recruiting and retaining skilled and experienced school business leaders has a knock-on impact on the workload of all leaders within a school, which in turn can result in further supply issues.

116. Released in January 2022, NAHT's report '*School business leadership in crisis?*' found that school business leadership was on the edge – with urgent and coordinated action required to ensure a sufficient supply of school business leaders for now and in the future:

- the number of school business leaders who would recommend school leadership fell by 10% between 2020 and 2021, from 48% to 43%
- three quarters (75%) of respondents disagreed that their salary fairly reflects the roles and responsibilities they undertake.<sup>45</sup>

117. NAHT's Crisis Point survey found rising dissatisfaction among school business leaders in October 2023:

- the number of school business leader respondents who would recommend school leadership fell to just 32%
- eight in ten (81%) SBL respondents disagreed that their salary fairly reflects the roles and responsibilities they undertake.<sup>46</sup>

118. When asked 'What could improve the attractiveness of school leadership as a career choice?' almost all (96%) school business leaders stated that pay that properly remunerates the range of responsibilities for their role was the key factor.<sup>47</sup>

119. While it is welcome that DfE now recognises the essential role that business leaders play in the school system, the Department continues to fail to provide the mechanisms to ensure pay parity.

120. If Government wants to ensure that a career in school business leadership is an attractive proposition, it **must** resolve pay disparity for school business leaders, so that they are remunerated at an equivalent level to other comparable leadership roles.

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<sup>45</sup> [School business leadership in crisis?](#), NAHT, 2022

<sup>46</sup> Specific data cut for SBLs is not included in published Crisis Point report

<sup>47</sup> Specific data cut for SBLs is not included in published Crisis Point report

## **2.5 The impact of real terms pay cuts on pensions**

121. NAHT once again draws the Review Body's attention to the impact of falling real terms salaries on pension accruals under the Teachers' Pension Scheme.
122. As evidenced above, the cash terms losses resulting from below inflation pay uplifts will run to tens of thousands of pounds over the last fourteen years. As a result, both serving teachers and school leaders have also suffered huge detriment to their future pension entitlements, brought about by lower overall personal and employer contributions, directly as a result of real terms pay cuts. It is worth re-emphasising that pension contributions represent salary forgone.
123. We urge the STRB to include consideration of pension losses resulting from falling real salaries when considering remuneration.

## Section 3 Affordability

*'My real worry is that we are being gaslit, time and time again, whatever level of education you are working at, whatever sector ...my concern is that people will give up and leave rather than fight for the future of the profession.'*

Secondary Executive Principal, West Midlands

### 3.1 Cost pressures

124. In its 33<sup>rd</sup> report, the STRB made it abundantly clear to government that

'Investment is needed to proactively manage the worsening recruitment position and declining competitiveness of teacher pay.'<sup>48</sup>

125. The Review Body was clear that its recommendations were primarily driven by

'...the structural deterioration in the relative pay of teachers and the inadequate recruitment of graduates. [It recognised that] Additional investment is needed and **it will be more cost-effective to act sooner rather than later**. The cost of failure is high: it affects teaching quality and adversely impacts children's education.'<sup>49</sup> [NAHT emphasis]

126. In making its recommendations the STRB was also admirably clear that

'...spending too little may appear to be a saving but gives rise to serious problems in subsequent years. The cost of remediating poor or unbalanced decisions can be significant and, in the medium term, can represent poor value for money.'<sup>50</sup>

127. The Secretary of State's remit letter fails to acknowledge or engage with any of the points above, instead focusing on '...the government's affordability position' that it promises '...will be set out in further written evidence.'<sup>51</sup>

128. At the time of writing, no such evidence has been published, even though government delayed setting a remit until 21 December. Neither has the Treasury published its economic evidence to the pay review bodies.

129. Statutory consultees have become somewhat inured to government's lackadaisical and careless approach to the remuneration of the professionals responsible for the education of the nation's children.

130. The routine is that remits are issued late and seek only to fetter the work of the STRB; government then fails to meet the Review Body's submission deadlines; key evidence is not released in time for statutory consultees to include in their submissions; ministers prevaricate for months after receiving the

<sup>48</sup> STRB 33<sup>rd</sup> report, 2023, p 1

<sup>49</sup> STRB 33<sup>rd</sup> report, 2023, p 22

<sup>50</sup> STRB 33<sup>rd</sup> report, 2023, pp 21-2

<sup>51</sup> Gillian Keegan's letter to Mike Aldred, 20 December 2023

Review Body's report; and decisions are finally made as or after schools break for the summer, creating exactly the unnecessary workload that ministers say they are committed to removing.

131. Following a protracted industrial dispute, where even the patience of relentlessly reasonable school leaders was exhausted, it might have been hoped that ministers, and government more widely, might have reflected on their mistakes and behaviours which led the members of all four main unions to demand ballots for strike action.
132. Once again, the Secretary of State has simply ignored the findings of the statutory report of the STRB that was set before her in May 2023, just seven months before the current remit was issued. And once again, the remit letter fails entirely to engage with the report that is supposed to inform it.
133. The case for a major correction to pay is undeniable. So, in the face of overwhelming evidence, the Secretary of State yet again deploys the smokescreen of affordability in order to distract and dissemble.
134. This year's strategy to fetter the Review Body's work is to ask it to focus on '...the Department's evidence on the impact of pay rises on schools' budgets' and to ask the STRB to have regard to 'the cost pressure schools are already facing and may face over the year (and how they affect **individual schools**)'.<sup>52</sup> [NAHT emphasis]
135. None of the above falls within the STRB's ambit. The STRB's role is to advise on the remuneration levels required to assure the supply of teachers and leaders. Decisions about funding are for government, not the STRB.
136. Even if this were the STRB's job, it is not in a position to fulfil this task. The Review Body cannot assess the affordability of a pay uplift for 22,000+ individual schools. Never mind that each school has its own financial context and circumstances, unique pupil body with its own specific needs and staff cohort, there are just too many schools for the Review Body to consider.
137. Government takes this approach because it simply cannot sustain an argument to counter the overwhelming evidence that an urgent pay correction is needed to repair the pay deterioration which has so badly damaged recruitment, retention and leadership aspiration. Government again shows contempt for teaching professionals and for the 'independent' statutory process which government supposedly subscribes to.
138. NAHT is clear that it will not be possible to deliver the major correction the Review Body believes is necessary to tackle the deterioration in the competitiveness and real terms value of teachers' and leaders' pay without **significant investment**.
139. Existing budgets are already inadequate to meet schools' needs. In November, ahead of the autumn statement, NAHT, NEU, ASCL & NASUWT issued a joint statement to the Chancellor raising concerns that per pupil funding

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<sup>52</sup> [Gillian Keegan's letter to Mike Aldred](#), 20 December 2023

will rise by just 1.9% in 2024-25, well below the rate of inflation. The joint statement forecasts that schools' costs will rise by 5.8% in the next year if a pay award equivalent to 2023-24 is awarded in 2024-25, requiring a minimum of £1.7bn increase in order to stand still.<sup>53</sup>

140. The statement also highlighted England's relatively low spend of 3.9% of national income on education, compared to the OECD average of 5%. For context, England's primary schools have the largest class sizes in Europe, and secondary school class sizes are the highest since records began more than forty years ago.
141. Securing the supply of high-quality teaching professionals that the nation's children and young people deserve, requires a step change to reverse the deterioration of teachers' and leaders' pay. **A significant increase in schools' core funding is an absolute requirement.** Schools simply **do not** have sufficient fiscal headroom to deliver the desperately needed transformational salary uplift.
142. Nothing less than a **fully funded, undifferentiated** uplift that runs **ahead of inflation** and **pay** in the wider economy will do.

### 3.2 Treasury evidence to the pay review bodies

143. At the time of writing, government's economic evidence to the pay review bodies has not been published.
144. This means that statutory consultees will be forced to comment on any evidence that Treasury chooses to present in the very short window for supplementary evidence.
145. Given its considerable resources, it is astonishing that government is unable to manage what is an annual process in a timely manner.

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<sup>53</sup> Joint union call for significant increase in school funding, 9 November 2023

## Section 4 Leadership and teacher supply

*'I have always believed in our profession and that we will find a way through. But now I am really frightened because I am seeing colleagues all around me going down. Lots of admired, strong, very talented professional colleagues are retiring early, are looking at other professions or are just becoming so unwell that they can't do their jobs. And that makes you feel vulnerable'*


Headteacher, Special school, South

### 4.1 State of the nation leadership supply indicators

146. Below, we consider a range of indicators which demonstrate that the pressures that undermine leadership aspiration and drive leadership attrition are intensifying rather than abating.
147. The interaction of the factors that affect leadership supply are complex, but the centrality of pay must not be underestimated. Government should make an immediate commitment to restore the real terms value of **all** leadership salaries to 2010 levels, and also restore the pay differential for leadership roles (and for experienced teachers). This would send a strong signal of value both to those serving in the profession and the wider labour market.
148. Even now, Government still has no significant strand of work in train to support leadership retention. Doubtless the DfE will point to its refurbishment of the content of existing national professional qualifications (and some very limited associated mentoring), but there is no evidence to suggest that this has had any effect on retention rates.
149. NAHT first warned of a leadership supply crisis seven years ago. Ignored by government, which remains focused solely on refilling the leaky early career teacher bucket, high levels of leadership attrition and a collapse in leadership aspiration threaten to undermine the very fabric of the nation's education system.
150. NAHT's latest survey evidence found that **discontent** among school leaders with leadership as a career choice has risen to **extraordinary levels**, underlining government's abject failure to tackle a crisis that it was first warned about in 2017.

(Continued overleaf...)

151. The number of leaders **unlikely to recommend** school leadership as a career choice **increased by a fifth** (21%) compared to 2021. Overall, for the **first time**, our survey found that **a majority** of school leaders (57%) would **not** recommend school leadership as a career goal.



Source: Crisis Point, NAHT December 2023<sup>54</sup>

152. **Most** leaders are **less** satisfied in their role. Approaching two-thirds (61%) of leaders said their level of satisfaction at work had declined over the last twelve months. Conversely, less than one in ten (9%) said that their level of work satisfaction had increased.




Source: Crisis Point, NAHT December 2023

<sup>54</sup> [Crisis Point](#), NAHT, December 2023 – NAHT surveyed 1890 school leaders in England between 21 September and 12 October 2023. The survey included head teachers, assistant and deputy heads, principals, heads of schools, school business leaders, executive leaders and middle leaders. The survey includes a mix of longitudinal questions and standalone questions.

153. In submissions to previous remits, we have presented clear evidence of collapsing leadership aspiration, which has been resolutely ignored by ministers. Our **latest data** underlines the scale of the challenge that now faces government if it is to secure the leaders that England’s schools require for the future.
154. Increasing reluctance to take on sole responsibility for a school is now an **established trend**. Our longitudinal survey could not be clearer, year on year fewer school leaders say they wish to become head teachers. Moreover, the school leadership journey appears to be broken, with aspiration declining at each step along the leadership ladder.
155. The chart below shows that the collapse in leadership aspiration is continuing to gather pace.
156. More than six in ten (61%) respondents who were not currently a head teacher now indicate that they do not aspire to headship, a rise of 15% in the last year alone, and 53% since 2016.

Percentage of assistant and deputy head teachers who said they do not aspire to headship



Source: Crisis Point, NAHT December 2023

157. The current structure of the pay system means that many deputy head teachers cannot afford to seek promotion in a smaller school, because a successful application would result in a pay cut for increased responsibility. This impedes mobility, particularly in the primary sector where a school leader often begins their headship journey by taking sole responsibility for a single form entry school, before moving onto a larger institution or an executive role, later in their career.
158. The risks of sole leadership and associated workload, particularly given government’s refusal to act to reform an unsafe inspection system, further disincentivises leadership. Adding ongoing relative and real terms pay erosion to this mix further saps aspiration.



159. While government has failed to act, wedded to its policy of reducing school leaders' pay in real terms, all of the available evidence continues to point to a future where there will be **both** insufficient numbers of teachers and school leaders to serve the nation's children.
160. A genuinely frightening future is now a distinct possibility. It will take time to recruit new, high quality and appropriately qualified recruits into teaching, and time for them to develop and hone their practice. Restoring leadership supply is an even longer-term task. Emergency action is needed to persuade and support existing leaders to stay in their roles, and to encourage experienced teachers to take on leadership roles.
161. For the first time ever, NAHT found that more than half of school leaders are considering leaving the profession within the next three years.




Source: Crisis Point, NAHT December 2023

162. Weighing up whether to make a career change is a difficult decision for any professional, but more so for those who have heavily invested in developing a career in school leadership. This is why we ask leaders to consider this question in a three-year time frame.
163. Not only must they weigh the powerful vocational aspects of their role, time is needed to think through alternative career options, and to review, prepare and plan how best to market their many transferable skills. Many leaders will also have considerable financial and family commitments that must be considered before committing to a career change.
164. Other studies looking at school leaders' intentions over **much shorter** timeframes therefore broadly support our findings – as expected the proportions of those saying that they are considering leaving are lower than is the case over the longer three year period, but the trajectory at between three months and a year is plausible.

(Continued overleaf...)

165. For example, NfER’s work on the impact of the cost-of-living crisis found that between that about a quarter and a third of senior leaders were considering leaving the profession within **the next year**.

**Figure 3 The percentage of teachers and senior leaders considering leaving the profession next year**



Source: NFER survey of 1441 senior leaders: 1170 gave a response and 1358 teachers: 1242 gave a response

Source: NFER<sup>55</sup>

166. Edurio’s research in the academy sector also returned similar results for senior leaders when asked if they have considered resigning in the past **three months**.



Source: Edurio<sup>56</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Cost of living crisis: impact on schools, NfER, 2023, p 8

<sup>56</sup> Staff retention by role: how experience impacts retention in English schools, Edurio, 2023

167. Our recent *Crisis Point* survey findings also build on our previous analysis of DfE data<sup>57</sup>, first obtained by NAHT through an FOI request, showing the proportion and destinations of leaders that actually leave their posts.

168. We found that in **all** school leadership categories wastage rates had **increased** when comparing the period 2011-2016, to the period 2015 – 2020 (the most recent available data), as the table below demonstrates.

	Year of appointment	Percentage of postholders new to post that have left that post within 5 years of appointment <sup>58</sup>			
		Head teachers	Deputy heads	Assistant heads	Middle leaders
Primary phase	2011 <sup>59</sup>	22%	25%	26%	43%
	2015 <sup>60</sup>	<b>25%</b>	<b>26%</b>	<b>29%</b>	<b>46%</b>
Secondary phase	2011 <sup>61</sup>	35%	32%	37%	43%
	2015 <sup>62</sup>	<b>37%</b>	<b>37%</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>44%</b>

Wastage rates of new school leaders aged under 50 within five years of appointment  
**Source:** NAHT analysis of data received from DfE following an FOI request and submitted in written evidence to the STRB<sup>63</sup>

169. Further analysis found that **a majority** of assistant and deputy heads, and head teachers, who left their post within five years of appointment are **no longer employed in state-funded schools** that serve 93% of England’s pupils. Moreover, approaching half of middle leaders who left their post are also recorded as having left the profession.

(Continued overleaf...)

<sup>57</sup> [School leadership in England 2010 to 2020](#) and the published [Addendum](#), DfE, April / June 2022

<sup>58</sup> Postholders did not move to a equivalent of higher post in the state-funded school system

<sup>59</sup> [School leadership 2010 to 2016: characteristics and trends](#), DfE, 2018, pp 55-56

<sup>60</sup> Obtained via a Freedom of Information request from DfE – the full data was provided alongside NAHT’s submission to the 32<sup>nd</sup> remit; later published as [School leadership in England 2010-2020: characteristics and trends](#), DfE, 28 April 2022

<sup>61</sup> [School leadership 2010 to 2016: characteristics and trends](#), DfE, 2018, pp 55-56

<sup>62</sup> Obtained via a Freedom of Information request from DfE & later published by DfE (see reference 58 above)

<sup>63</sup> Data available in [School leadership 2010 to 2020: characteristics and trends](#), DfE, 28 April 2022

170. **Overall**, about a third (31%) of primary and secondary senior leaders left their post within five years,<sup>64</sup> more than half (53%) of whom quit teaching in state funded schools that serve 93% of England’s pupils.<sup>65</sup>



171. NAHT’s analysis also found differences in both retention rates and destinations by phase and leadership role.

172. In the **primary phase** more than a quarter (27%) of senior leaders left their post within five years, of whom more than half (52%) quit teaching in state-funded schools.<sup>66</sup>

- A quarter (25%) of **primary head teachers** left their post within five years, almost two-thirds (64%) of whom left teaching in state-funded schools.
- More than a quarter (26%) of **primary deputy head teachers** left their post within five years, approaching half (46%) of whom left teaching in state-funded schools.
- Approaching a third (29%) of **primary assistant head teachers** left their post within five years, over half (52%) of whom left teaching in state-funded schools

(Continued overleaf...)

<sup>64</sup> DfE data records 9370 assistant, deputy, and head teacher appointees in 2015, of whom 2925 left their post within five years

<sup>65</sup> DfE data records 2925 assistant, deputy and head teachers aged under 50 when appointed left their post within five years of which 1553 (53%) left teaching in state-funded schools

<sup>66</sup> DfE data records 1596 assistant, deputy and head teachers aged under 50 when appointed left their post within five years (c. 27% of those appointed) of which 836 (52%) left teaching in state-funded schools

173. In the **secondary phase**, more than a third (38%) of senior leaders left their post within five years, of whom more than half (54%) quit teaching in state-funded schools.<sup>67</sup>

- More than a third (37%) of **secondary head teachers** left their post within five years, more than two in three (67%) of whom left teaching in state-funded schools.
- More than a third (37%) of **secondary deputy head teachers** left their post within five years, almost two-thirds (62%) of whom left teaching in state-funded schools
- Almost four in 10 (39%) **secondary assistant head teachers** left their post within five years, almost half (49%) of whom left teaching in state-funded schools

174. In **middle leadership** roles

- Approaching half (46%) of **primary middle leaders** left their post within five years, of whom four in 10 (41%) left teaching in state-funded schools.
- More than four in 10 (44%) **secondary middle leaders** left their post within five years, of whom more than half (55%) left teaching in state-funded schools.

175. The table below shows the number of leaders, appointed in 2015 and aged under 50, that left their post within 5 years.

How many school leaders leave their post within five years of appointment?

School leaders aged under 50 appointed in 2015*								
	Primary leaders				Secondary leaders			
	Middle leader	Ass. head teacher	Deputy head teacher	Head teacher	Middle leader	Ass. head teacher	Deputy head teacher	Head teacher
Appointees in 2015	10940	2500	2090	1310	16900	2230	860	380
Number of leaders that left their post within five years	5032	725	543	328	7436	870	318	141

Source: Addendum to *School leadership in England 2010 -to 2020*, DfE, 9 June 2022

<sup>67</sup> DfE data records 1329 assistant, deputy and head teachers aged under 50 when appointed as having left their post within five years (c. 38% of those appointed), of which 717 (54%) left teaching in state-funded schools.

176. The table below shows the number of leaders, appointed in 2015 and aged under 50, that left their post within 5 years, **and** left teaching in state funded schools.


How many of those that leave their post leave teaching altogether?

School leaders aged under 50 appointed in 2015*								
	Primary leaders				Secondary leaders			
	Middle leader	Ass. head teacher	Deputy head teacher	Head teacher	Middle leader	Ass. head teacher	Deputy head teacher	Head teacher
<b>Left teaching</b> in state-funded schools	2079	375	251	210	4056	424	198	95
<b>Remained in a less senior teaching role</b> in state-funded schools	2954	350	293	118	3380	446	120	46

Source: Addendum to *School leadership in England 2010 -to 2020*, DfE, 9 June 2022

178. The chart below shows NAHT’s analysis of the latest available DfE workforce data, which demonstrates the system’s failure to offer sufficiently rewarding and sustainable careers that will carry teaching professionals through to retirement age.

179. Overall, the number of professionals leaving before retirement has increased by 38% since 2010/11. The data shows a steady decline in the number of teachers leaving at retirement age, and sharp growth in those who are ‘out of service’ before retirement age.<sup>68</sup>



Source: NAHT analysis of DfE school workforce data


<sup>68</sup> [School workforce in England, 2022](#)

180. Cutting the DfE's data by role reveals **extraordinarily shocking results**. NAHT's analysis finds a catastrophic collapse in the number of assistant heads, deputy heads and head teachers serving until retirement age. In 2010/11

- more than three in four (78%) head teachers served until retirement
- more than one in two (52%) assistant and deputy heads served until retirement.

181. However, by 2021/22 the number of:

- head teachers serving until retirement had **fallen by 65% to around one in four (27%)**
- assistant heads and deputy heads serving until retirement had **fallen by 75% to around one in ten (13%)**



Source: NAHT analysis of DfE school workforce data<sup>69</sup>

182. The number of classroom teachers serving until retirement age also **collapsed** by 77% (albeit from a smaller base). **Less than one in ten** classroom teachers now serves until retirement.

(Continued overleaf...)


<sup>69</sup> [School workforce in England, 2022](#)

183. The chart below displays shows the flip side of this data. In 2110/11

- around one in five (22%) head teachers were out of service before retirement age
- less than one in two (48%) assistant and deputy heads were out of service before retirement age.

184. By 2021/22 the number of:

- head teachers out of service before retirement age **increased by 232%**
- assistant and deputy head teachers out of service before retirement age **increased by 81%**.



Source: NAHT analysis of DfE school workforce data<sup>70</sup>

(Continued overleaf...)


<sup>70</sup> [School workforce in England, 2022](#)



185. These data chime with indicators of rising **head teacher turnover**, which is 14% higher than before the pandemic. Overall, there were 1,709 head teacher changes in September 2023, compared to 1,502 in September 2019. Analysis by SchoolDash<sup>71</sup> using DfE data **confirms** that head teacher vacancies are increasing across all phases, and most markedly in the primary sector.

### New headteacher appointments by year (primary)

Figure 1: New headteacher appointments among state schools in England



Source: SchoolDash

186. SchoolDash report<sup>72</sup> that the increased churn in head teacher vacancies might be driven, at least in part, by heads bringing forward their retirement or making career changes – a hypothesis that is supported by NAHT’s survey findings.

187. Moreover, DfE’s own workforce data confirms that more headteachers are leaving their posts before retirement. The latest available data shows that 1,615 head teachers left the profession in 2021-22 for reasons other than retirement or death, compared with 976 in 2018-19, the last academic year before the pandemic. In 2010/11 just 438 left their posts before retirement.<sup>73</sup>

188. Government’s neglect and abuse of school leaders has come home to roost. Assailed by falling real pay, crushing workload, and unreliable, unsafe inspection that carries career defining consequences, many serving leaders are voting with their feet.


189. Moreover, both serving and aspiring leaders have become keenly aware of the unacceptable mental health and well-being risks associated with their high-pressure roles.

<sup>71</sup> [Are Schools losing their heads?](#) SchoolDash, 6 October 2023

<sup>72</sup> [Are Schools losing their heads?](#) SchoolDash, 6 October 2023

<sup>73</sup> Reported in [Schools Week](#), 6 October 2023

190. NAHT asked school leaders who are considering leaving the profession for their reasons – almost **nine in ten (88%)** cited concerns about the impact of their role on their **personal well-being**. Contributory factors scored highly: more than eight in ten (83%) chose workload pressures, while almost two-thirds (61%) said they felt overwhelmed or helpless in providing pastoral support for pupils.



Source: Crisis Point, NAHT December 2023


191. The Review Body should take note that **more than one in two (53%)** are considering leaving because they believe that pay does **not** reflect the responsibility of their role.

192. This should be no surprise. In addition to years of relative and real terms pay erosion and the erosion of the salary differential for leadership, school leaders have seen their areas of responsibility expand exponentially.

193. This speaks to the enormous challenges of a school leaders' role, which now extends far beyond the classroom. Poverty, absent health and social care services, duties related to Prevent, knife crime, lack of support for families and the society wide mental health crisis services (and many others) all land on the desk of leaders.


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194. It's unsurprising, therefore, when asked about the barriers for those aspiring to headship, that concerns about personal well-being were **also** cited as the most important barrier, by over nine in ten (91%) school leaders.




Source: Crisis Point, NAHT December 2023

195. NAHT's research again finds shocking health impacts associated with leadership. We have been reporting similar findings for at least five years, yet there is no concerted action to tackle the causes of the health crisis afflicting both school leaders and teachers. It is no surprise that many aspiring school leaders now conclude that progression to headship represents an unacceptable risk to their long-term health.



Source: Crisis Point, NAHT December 2023

196. Unprepared to accept the evidence of statutory consultees, government commissioned its own longitudinal survey, through DfE's *Working lives of teachers and leaders*,<sup>74</sup> producing notably convergent results to the research that had been conducted by trade unions.
197. The STRB will be aware of the wave 1 findings, for which ministers withheld publication until after the close of last year's statutory consultation period.
198. Unions have seen the headline analysis of the wave 2 field work, completed about a year ago, but this is subject to a confidentiality agreement that prevents us from referring to the outcomes in this submission.
199. Notwithstanding, NAHT's own evidence (above and below) should suffice.
200. NAHT has long ceased to be surprised by the findings of our research, but one aspect of this year's survey produced the most **worrying** outcomes that we have ever recorded.
201. We asked school leaders if they had accessed any professional mental health or well-being support over the last year.
- Almost **one in two** (49%) school leaders identified that they had a need for professional mental health or well-being support in the last 12 months.
  - Almost **four in ten** (38%) said they had accessed professional support; a further 7% wanted access to support but did not know how to secure it and 5% found access to be unavailable.



Source: Crisis Point, NAHT December 2023

<sup>74</sup> [Working lives of teachers and leaders](#) – wave 1 report, DfE, (April 2023)

202. While it is encouraging that many were both willing and able to access the support they needed, these data raise serious concerns about the drivers of what is now a widespread mental health and well-being crisis afflicting all career stages of the teaching profession.
203. NAHT's data chimes with that of Education Support, which found that in the last academic year 82% of senior leaders had experienced mental health symptoms due to their work and 41% had experienced a mental health issue. Almost nine in ten (89%) senior leaders described themselves as stressed in 2023 and almost all (95%) head teachers said they were stressed. Almost one in four senior leaders (24%) identified as being acutely stressed.<sup>75</sup>
204. NAHT membership provides school leaders with dedicated access to Education Support, including a 24 hour telephone service. To its credit, DfE has also funded some limited support through Education Support. The Department's own evaluation found that 'There is a strong need and demand for the service amongst school leaders, as evidenced by the higher-than-forecasted application numbers from 2022 and comments from sector stakeholders and participants. Despite this, participants faced barriers to engagement, for example high workload, that are outside of the control of delivery staff.'<sup>76</sup>
205. Digging deeper, NAHT commissioned roundtable meetings with leaders working across the English regions, representing the full range of leadership roles. These conversations generate important qualitative data, providing additional insight into our quantitative findings.
206. The discussion revealed the extent of psychological and physical exhaustion that have resulted from government-by-diktat and a corrosively negative narrative about teaching in the media. This is wearing down the resilience of school leaders, their willingness to continue, and the appetite of middle leaders to step up into senior leadership.
207. While this is a result of what one participant called "a swirling mix' of toxic accountability, workload, lack of professional recognition, and budget pressures, pay erosion sits powerfully in the mix. One secondary head teacher working in the South told us:

'Professionally, I am depressed. And that's not me at all. Usually, no matter how rough it's been, I've bought the 'it'll be better tomorrow approach', the 'there will be something'. But we're so deep in this nose-dive, which is now so complex, the state things have got to, there are so many layers and factors, I just can't see how it can be fixed. And there is clearly no appetite within government to fix it whatsoever'

Secondary head teacher (South)

(Continued overleaf...)

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<sup>75</sup> [Teacher well-being index](#), Education Support, 2023, p 13 & 55

<sup>76</sup> [School leader mental health and wellbeing service evaluation](#) , DfE, October 2023

208. Another explained

'...anybody would want recognition financially and otherwise for the incredible jobs that they do... it is not the pay so much as the erosion over time and what that's done to the profession, what that's done to individual leaders, the profession as a collective'

Primary assistant head teacher (London)

209. Increasingly many serving and aspiring leaders conclude that a salary that is falling both in real terms against inflation, and in relation to the wider employment market, is insufficient to offset the increasing professional pressure and health risks associated with the role.

210. In response, over many remits, NAHT has pressed for the creation of more sustainable long term career pathways for both teachers and leaders.

211. This includes developing attractive late career options for both teachers and leaders, to ensure that the system can continue to benefit from their knowledge, skills and experience, and particularly retain their expertise and insight to mentor and coach the next generation of teaching professionals.

212. Among the mix of options and possibilities NAHT has repeatedly urged government to promote **genuinely** flexible approaches, such as phased retirement options. Phased retirement would be good for the sector, ease supply pressures, and offer late career leaders and teachers a smoother pathway to retirement alongside a more financially attractive alternative to an actuarially reduced pension.

213. The Department's complacency and lack of interest on such matters is best illustrated by the mothballing of the Teachers Working Longer stakeholder group, which has not been convened since February 2020.<sup>77</sup>

214. The ramifications of this catastrophic and ongoing failure to secure the supply of school leaders is extraordinarily serious. School leaders are the most experienced professionals in the system meaning that they are critical to leading, managing and nurturing England's teaching workforce, which is the youngest, and therefore least experienced, in the OECD. Less than one in five (18%) of England's secondary teachers<sup>78</sup> are aged 50 or older, compared to the OECD average of 39%.<sup>79</sup>

215. OECD's TALIS study (which covered the UK before government unilaterally withdrew, without consultation) similarly found that head teachers (principals) are also younger in England than the OECD average: just 5% of English head teachers were aged 60 and over, compared to 20%, on average, for OECD countries.<sup>80</sup> There is no reason to suppose that this latter data has improved in recent years.

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<sup>77</sup> <https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/teachers-working-longer-review-group>

<sup>78</sup> In upper secondary programmes

<sup>79</sup> OECD Education at a glance, 2023: OECD indicators, [United Kingdom](#)

<sup>80</sup> [Country note](#), TALIS, OECD, 2018 results

216. The evidence of a profession in free fall has been plain to see. Ministers and government were repeatedly warned of the risks to leadership supply, and the threat that this posed to the overall stability of the profession.
217. Statutory consultees have repeatedly explained that the loss of highly experienced staff at all levels across the profession would impact pupils and create a downward supply spiral, by making teaching a less attractive career choice for high quality graduates.
218. The alarm bells were rung. But none of the ten secretaries of state responsible for education over the last decade have grasped the nettle.
219. Instead of tackling the root causes, ministers ignored the evidence, instead focusing on at best, inconsequential, and, at worst, downright harmful policy programmes. Ministers championed: 'pay 'freedoms'', performance related pay progression, flattening pay, unworkable flexible working policies, 'market reviews' of teacher training, and strict ideological control of pedagogy.
220. Cash has been poured into bursaries, grants for overseas teachers and other 'incentives', while real terms pay cuts have been forced on serving professionals, cloaked in the language of austerity and affordability.
221. **Not a single one** of these policy initiatives has had even the slightest positive impact on teacher and leader supply. A chaotic policy quagmire has served only to destabilise supply further, affecting the system's ability to secure and retain professionals to teach in, and lead, the nation's schools, to the direct detriment of the nation's children and young people.
222. High quality graduates, who carry large student loan debt, do not want to work in a profession blighted by falling real terms pay, inadequate pay progression, insufficient funding, crushing workload, and an unreliable, unsafe inspection system that puts teachers' and leaders' lives at risk.
223. Instead, the 'best and the brightest' seek good remuneration and fair reward, professional recognition, sustainable workload and the opportunity to exercise autonomy, agency, and independence in their work.
224. So, Michael Gove's 'ambition' of securing the 'top' 5- 10% of graduates to work in schools foundered. Instead, the DfE is reduced to scraping the barrel to fill teaching roles by recruiting overseas and lowering entry requirements to allow those without a degree to train on the job. Only in the most fevered imagination of those in denial could this pass for a 'global' or 'world leading' approach.

## 4.2 Teacher supply

225. DfE's workforce data is published annually in June of each year, meaning that the Review Body and statutory consultees must make do with statistics that are more than a year old. The most recent published data was published in June 2023 and relates to 2022.

226. There is **no** positive movement on teacher attrition. The latest school workforce data confirms that the wastage rates are increasing.

- In 2022 43,997 teachers quit the profession, an increase of more than 7,800 on 2021.
- **Year one retention rates again fell** by just under half a percentage point, from 87.6% to 87.2% - this despite the roll out of DfE's much trumpeted Early Career Framework (ECF), perhaps indicating that DfE should have heeded the warnings offered by trade unions about the excessive workload associated created by its inflexible and narrow approach.
- Almost a third (**31.3%**) of teachers **leave within five years** of qualification, at exactly the point that studies suggest a teacher reaches full efficacy, perfectly exemplifying the wasteful cost of continued policy failure.
- Overall, **retention rates fell in every category** between 2021 and 2022 for teachers in service for between 1 and 11 years. For every recorded cohort of teachers, fewer teachers were retained in 2022 than 2021.<sup>81</sup>

227. Further evidence of system wide policy failure is to be found in the huge increase in the number of professionals taking **early retirement**, which leapt by 42% between September 2022 and September 2023, and by 87% when compared to September 2021.<sup>82</sup>

228. Teacher pay also requires a **major correction** in order to restore to competitiveness in the graduate labour market and reverse years of real terms pay erosion.

229. School leaders and experienced teachers at the top of the upper pay scale have seen the worst relative and real terms pay decline of all teaching professionals as differentiated pay uplifts in favour of early career teachers have undermined pay progression associated with experience and leadership responsibility.

230. The clear message is that a **fully funded, universal, undifferentiated** uplift is urgently required as an interim measure to reset pay and correct the market decline of the teaching profession. Hard-headed logic dictates that this correction cannot be postponed any longer.

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<sup>81</sup> School workforce in England, June 2023

<sup>82</sup> Data obtained by Quilter under FOI and reported by the [Financial Times](#), 21 November 2023



### 4.3 Vacancy rates

231. DfE's headline data reports that full and part time vacancies more than **doubled** between 2020 (1,098) and 2022 (2,334):

- in the single year to 2022/23 recorded vacancies grew **sharply** from 0.3% to 0.5% of the workforce, the **fastest** rate of growth at any time since 2010/11.
- the 0.5% vacancy rate is **higher** than at any time since 2010/11.<sup>83</sup>
- the trend for vacancies is steadily upward since 2010/11, rising from a stable 0.1%

232. The number of temporarily filled posts also **increased** between 2020/21 (2,128) and 2022/23 (3,308).

- in the single year to 2022/23 recorded temporarily filled posts **also grew sharply** from 0.5% to 0.7% of the workforce

233. However, these headline rates do not tell the full story.

234. Last year, NAHT again recorded our frustration that these data provide only a partial picture which vastly under-reports the impact of school vacancies on pupils, and the extent to which it contributes to additional workload for teachers and school leaders.

235. Central to our concerns has been the DfE's failure to update its analysis of data showing **the number of schools** with *at least* one advertised vacancy or one temporarily filled post on census day. This was last reported in the DfE's published school workforce data in 2017.<sup>84</sup>

236. Reporting the number of schools with vacancies is critical to understanding the **real-world impact** that vacancies have on pupils, because the lack of stable, permanent staffing has a profoundly negative impact on the progress and attainment of pupils, ultimately affecting their outcomes and life chances, and overall school performance.

237. In order to provide up to date evidence for the Review Body, NAHT submitted a freedom of information request to establish whether the data in question was still collected and, if so, to gain access to it.

238. The official response confirmed that these data are collected and also published, but obscurely within the School Workforce data catalogue,<sup>85</sup> without any accompanying analysis or commentary.


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<sup>83</sup>[School workforce in England](#), June 2023; this takes into account growth in the workforce which was insufficient to offset the increase in vacancies. Additional note: the growth in the workforce has failed to keep pace with growth in pupil numbers

<sup>84</sup> [School workforce in England Nov 2016](#), DfE, 2017

<sup>85</sup> [School Workforce data catalogue](#), DfE June 2023 (2022 data)


239. The chart below summarises the **national** data analysis. The **proportion of schools** with a least one vacancy or at least one temporary post has **increased** since 2019 from one in eight (12%) to more than one in seven (15%).



Source: NAHT analysis of DfE workforce data<sup>86</sup>

240. Across all phases, more than one in four (26%) outer London schools, and more than one in five (21%) inner London schools reported a vacancy or temporarily filled post on census day in 2022.

241. The number of vacant or temporarily filled posts was significantly higher across the **secondary phase**. In 2022 more than one in four (41%) secondary schools reported a vacancy or temporarily filled post on census day. This was an increase of almost a third (32%) on the 2019 average.



Source: NAHT analysis of DfE workforce data<sup>87</sup>

<sup>86</sup> [School Workforce data catalogue::tables showing teacher vacancies for LA, regional and national level; teacher vacancies - school level; & teacher and support staff by school](#)

<sup>87</sup> [School Workforce data catalogue::tables showing teacher vacancies for LA, regional and national level; teacher vacancies - school level; & teacher and support staff by school](#)

242. The 2022 data shows a very high proportion of secondary schools reporting a vacancy or a temporarily filled post, including


- more than one in two (54%) in outer London
- just under one in two (48%) in the South East
- more than four in ten (44%) in inner London
- more than four in ten (43%) in the East of England
- more than four in ten (41%) in the West Midlands.

243. Even in the North East region, which recorded the lowest rate, almost one in three (30%) secondary schools reported having at least one vacancy or temporarily filled post.

244. This matters because teacher churn and staffing instability are strongly associated with negative outcomes for pupils. In a secondary school the impact of a vacancy or temporarily filled post is likely to be felt widely across the student body. Depending on the subject area, the lack of a permanent main scale teacher might affect 200 or more students each week, right across the age range.

245. Where recruitment is particularly problematic, if feasible, it would be common for schools to seek to protect examination classes by making alterations to a number of teachers' timetables, perhaps using non-specialists for key stage 3 groups. However, this acts as a workload driver for all staff: teachers, curriculum heads and school leaders. Not only may teachers be required to teach unfamiliar subjects, but curriculum heads must also support and oversee delivery, and school leaders must reassure and manage understandably anxious parents and pupils.

246. Analysis for vacant and temporarily filled posts in the **primary** phase shows a similar pattern, albeit at a lower rate, of just under one in ten schools.



Source: NAHT analysis of DfE workforce data<sup>88</sup>

<sup>88</sup> [School Workforce data catalogue](#): tables showing: teacher vacancies for LA, regional and national level; teacher vacancies - school level; & teacher and support staff by school

247. London again is an outlier, with about one in six (16%) of outer London and one in seven (14%) inner London schools recording a vacancy or temporarily filled post.
248. These lower rates of vacant or temporarily filled posts are nevertheless of equal concern to those found in the secondary phase. The turbulence of a vacancy or a temporarily filled post has potentially significant impacts for primary aged pupils, who are typically taught mostly by a single teacher every day of the week.
249. For younger pupils, consistency, routine and relationships are critical to their progress. Teachers' assessment of pupils' progress, feedback and interventions are complex matters that must cover the full range of core and foundation subjects, relying on detailed knowledge and understanding of a pupil's needs. Insecure or unstable staffing can all too easily undermine the accurate assessment of pupils and the accuracy of interventions that may be needed to support their progress.
250. Across both phases, recruitment to fill high levels of vacancies creates additional **workload**, and also **severe funding pressures** resulting from associated supply costs required to fill roles temporarily.
251. Official statistics show that LA maintained schools (academies are **not** included) spent over £698m on supply teaching costs in 2022-23, a 12.3% increase on 2021-22. Spending on agency staff rose by 17% in the same period to £485.6m.<sup>89</sup>
252. Comparable data for academies is not available. Academies are not required to complete a consistent financial return (CFR), but instead complete academies accounts returns (AAR).<sup>90</sup> However, research by the Labour party estimates the cost overall cost of supply in the academy sector to be in the region of £1.2bn.<sup>91</sup>
253. To put this in context, the combined estimated spend on supply for maintained schools and academies of about £1.9bn would come close to funding an 8% uplift to the pay of all staff in state-funded schools for the 2024-25 pay award.

#### 4.4 Recruitment to teacher training

254. The DfE's approach to initial teacher training (ITT) is as deeply flawed as other aspects of its failed recruitment and retention strategy.

(Continued overleaf...)

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<sup>89</sup> [LA and school expenditure, Financial year 2022-23 – Explore education statistics – GOV.UK \(explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk\)](https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk)

<sup>90</sup> [Schools financial benchmarking](#), DfE

<sup>91</sup> Widely reported, including in [FE news](#), 14 August 2023

255. The Review Body has been proved correct in its view, set out in its 31<sup>st</sup> report that

‘... the 2008 recession indicates that improved recruitment numbers may be relatively short-lived as the wider graduate labour market recovers. The profession’s ability to recruit new teachers is inextricably linked to the wider graduate labour market. As such, the extent to which the improvement in ITT recruitment in 2020 is sustained into the future will be influenced by the speed of recovery in the wider market.’<sup>92</sup>

256. Recruitment to teacher training has collapsed. Secondary recruitment is an unmitigated disaster.

- Overall, the secondary postgraduate ITT (PGITT) target was missed by 50% (down from 57% in 2022/23, and 79% in 2021/22)
- recruitment targets fell and were missed in
  - Business studies by 84%
  - Physics by 83%
  - Music by 73%
  - Design and technology by 73%
  - Modern Foreign Languages by 67%
  - Computing by 64%
  - Religious Education by 56%
  - Art and Design by 56%
  - Geography by 44%
  - Mathematics by 37%
  - Chemistry by 35%
  - English by 26%
  - Drama by 21%
  - Biology by 7%
- Only History, Physical Education and Classics recruited a surplus.<sup>93</sup>

257. These failures build on years of shortfalls against previous recruitment targets. Meanwhile the prime minister has announced a policy for all students to study Maths and English to 18, even though there are already too few recruits, and too few serving teachers, of these subjects. As an aside, here was yet another policy announcement where government failed to even discuss the policy intention with representative bodies before making public its intentions.

258. Last year’s primary ITT recruitment outcomes saw the worrying re-establishment of the downward trend in the recruitment of trainees, as the number collapsed from (a pandemic induced) 133% of target in 2021 to 93%, the lowest level recorded since 2014/15.<sup>94</sup>

259. This year’s primary ITT target was **missed** by 4%, even after the target was cut during the recruitment round in April 2023 by 21%. The scale of the reduction

<sup>92</sup> STRB 31<sup>st</sup> report p 67

<sup>93</sup> Initial Teacher Training Census 2023/24, DfE

<sup>94</sup> Initial Teacher Training Census 2023/24, DfE

is **not** explicable by the demographic fall in primary pupil numbers, nor has DfE been able to account for its depth. Any miss in primary recruitment is, of itself, a real indicator of failure. That failure would have been deeper and more noticeable had the target not been reduced so dramatically.

260. Recruitment to primary teacher training is, once again, clearly exhibiting the signs of the failure that were apparent prior to the pandemic, as tight recruitment conditions across graduate careers has become re-established. The indications are that recruitment to primary ITT is becoming much more challenging, regardless of the cyclical fall in primary pupil numbers.
261. Final data published in DfE's *Initial Teacher Training Census* confirmed a 5% reduction in ITT entrants to 26,955 against 2022/23 (28,991), and a fall of 25% when compared to 2021/22 (36,159)<sup>95</sup>. This breaks last year's record under recruitment, setting a new record for the **lowest recorded number of entrants since comparable records began in 2015/16**.
262. The DfE continues to rely on a bursary payments scheme to attract prospective teachers into training, with tax free payments ranging from £10,000 to as much as £28,000 for some subjects (physics, chemistry, computing and maths). Some undergraduate and forces bursaries are also available.
263. The requirements are straightforward, with the minimum being a bachelor's lower second class (2.2) honours degree. The bursary is paid automatically to those studying qualifying subjects. An alternative, slightly higher 'scholarship' is available to those with a minimum upper second (2.1) training in Chemistry, Computing, MFL, Mathematics, or Physics who apply, paid by charitable bodies, not government.<sup>96</sup>
264. Bursaries are somewhat effective in increasing recruitment to teacher training, but their overall impact on teacher numbers is very limited. And given that government has missed its teacher training targets in ten of the last eleven years, and by 50% in the last year alone,<sup>97</sup> it is clearly a very limited policy solution.
265. This relentless focus on recruiting new entrants, to fill gaps left by huge early career wastage rates has led to endless cycles of recruitment and training for incredibly limited benefit. The result is that England has one of the most inexperienced teaching workforces of any OECD country.
266. This constant refilling of the leaky bucket is necessary because government refuses to improve teacher and leader retention by focusing on **retention**. It has failed to tackle the causes of attrition and wastage, which are known and well understood. Falling relative and real terms pay, unsustainable workload pressures, ill health, and unsafe high stakes inspection drive teachers and leaders from the profession.

<sup>95</sup> [Initial Teacher Training Census 203/24](#), DfE

<sup>96</sup> See [Get into teaching, Bursaries and Scholarships](#), DfE

<sup>97</sup> [Initial Teacher Training Census 202/24](#), DfE

267. Bursaries have also been found to **heighten inequality** in the teaching workforce, by incentivising applications to teacher training courses from older applicants (career changers), male applicants and those from a white ethnic background; and decreasing applicants from BAME backgrounds.<sup>98</sup> When applied solely to secondary subjects, these inequalities in the perceived value of secondary as opposed to primary teaching also de-incentivise entry to primary teacher training, which is seen as a less attractive career option.
268. Tackling the core issues requires government investment and the empowerment of teaching professionals. In previous submissions NAHT has set out the need to create a compelling proposition for graduates that will attract and retain them within teaching. This requires competitive salaries that keep pace with the cost of living, competitive pay progression commensurate with graduate expectations, a sustainable work life balance, and a fair, safe and humane accountability system.
269. Government refuses to act on these core issues. As a result, bursaries remain ineffective.
270. The policy pattern is also clear. Government conducts lots of activity, often labelled 'reform', 'review' or 'system change', rather than focusing on the key issues of pay, workload, wellbeing and accountability.
271. So, we have an ITT 'market review', an 'early career framework', a review of the 'early career framework', a joining of the core content framework and the early career framework, a review of national professional qualifications, the development of a non-graduate route into teaching and a switch to more apprenticeships.
272. **None of which deal with the core issues** - low and falling pay, limited pay progression, crushing workload, unreliable and unsafe school inspection. In fact, the 'reform' 'review' and 'system change' activities actively undermine professional recognition, independence and agency, exacerbating the supply crisis.
273. While there is evidence that bursaries achieve recruitment into teacher training, albeit to varying degrees year upon year, they do not make a statistically significant difference to retention rates. In fact, DfE statistics show that, on average, the higher the bursary an ITT trainee receives, the lower the likelihood that they receive their teaching qualification and are in teaching in subsequent years.<sup>99</sup>
274. Recent research theorised that 'a starting cohort of 100 teachers will translate, through attrition, into 41 teachers that stay beyond their fifth year in teaching. However, a £5,000 bursary increase, all else equal, leads to 115 teachers entering training and 47 teachers staying beyond their fifth year in teaching' and asserted that those additional teachers are 'more likely to teach in disadvantaged schools.'<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> [Do bursaries change who applies to teacher training?](#) NFER, 2021

<sup>99</sup> [Destinations of trainee teachers awarded a bursary](#), DfE 2018

<sup>100</sup> [The impact of training bursaries on teacher recruitment and retention](#), NFER, 2023

275. Notwithstanding, this contributes little to resolving the supply crisis. The answer does not lie in complex econometrics and statistical inference. Continuing to try to find a way out of the supply crisis through small tweaks and tangential policy developments is doomed to failure.
276. All manner of policy gimmicks, including flattening pay, pay differentiation by subject, phase or location (sometimes referred to as split pay), and various combinations have been the subject of the sort of theoretical imaginings that excite econometricists, and generate attractive charts.
277. What these approaches lack is a **commitment** to provide the best for 93% of England's children and young people educated in state funded schools. All that is needed in the sixth wealthiest nation in the world is the political will and commitment to resolve the problem.
278. To be clear England **can** afford to invest to ensure that the nation's schools are plentifully staffed with highly qualified teachers, who work in rewarding and sustainable careers. Politicians simply have to choose to make that investment.
279. The supply crisis is evidence of 15 years of policy failure. It is **impossible** to see a way out of this morass without a major correction on pay, focused on delivering vastly improved retention, accompanied by decisive action on workload, accountability, and health. To prosper, our schools need to offer a well-paid, attractive and sustainable career option for high quality graduates, that will retain and sustain them well into their third decade of service.

#### 4.5. Supply from overseas

280. A valuable source of teacher supply from Europe, particularly for secondary subject areas such as modern languages, continues to decline.
281. The number of European Economic Area (EEA) and Swiss teachers awarded Qualified Teacher Status (QTS) has now **dwindled to almost nothing**. Just 672 awards of QTS were made to European trained teachers in 2022-23,<sup>101</sup> a **decline** of approaching (86%) when compared to the 4,795 EEA teachers who were awarded QTS in 2015/16.<sup>102</sup>
282. No data or estimate is available to accurately measure the outflow of European teachers who have left the UK since 2016, making it impossible to measure the overall loss of European teachers to the English system following the 2016 referendum.
283. The number of awards of QTS to teachers from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the USA has grown from 977 in 2021-22 to 1330 in 2022-23, however, this still represents a 22% decrease since 2016-17 (1,715).<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Source [TRA annual report and accounts](#) year ended March 2023, p 80

<sup>102</sup> [Initial teacher training: trainee number census - 2017 to 2018](#), SFR68 / 2017, p10

<sup>103</sup> Source [TRA annual report and accounts](#) year ended March 2023, p 80



284. DfE is targeting qualified overseas teachers from a handful of countries who have a specialism in languages, maths or science, to seek QTS in England, backed by relocation payments of £10,000, although foreign workers and their dependents are liable for NHS surcharges, and must meet visa requirements.
285. The latest available data covering February to July 2023 shows that of 21,003 applicants, just 1,110 (5%) met the requirements to be awarded QTS, allowing them to teach in England.<sup>104</sup> The available data does not record how many teachers have actually come to work in England.
286. Recruitment from overseas is a workload intensive, costly and bureaucratic exercise for a school, who must take on the role of sponsoring any staff that they employ, along with associated legal responsibilities related to their visa and immigration status.<sup>105</sup> The long lead time for overseas recruitment does not dovetail with England's three resignation and recruitment points in the academic year.
287. Moreover, overseas teachers are unlikely to be granted indefinite leave to remain in England, meaning that the policy provides, at best, a small sticking plaster for a handful of schools. The system needs a permanent, stable workforce, not more teacher churn. Once again, ministers would do better to focus departmental resources on securing the conditions which will recruit and retain teachers and leaders into decades-long careers.

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<sup>104</sup> [QTS applicants and awards to overseas teachers](#), DfE, November 2023

<sup>105</sup> [Recruit teachers from overseas](#), DfE

## Section 5 Pay equality

### 5.1 DfE's continued failure to meet its equality duty

288. Government has continued to fail to provide the meaningful, and regular, analysis of pay equality for gender and other protected characteristics. Government is required to publish information with regard to people affected by their policies and practices every year, and also specifically with reference to pay and gender.
289. In response, NAHT, in collaboration with ASCL, NGA and WomenEd, has once again, undertaken an analysis of the DfE's latest School Workforce Census<sup>106</sup> to analyse the current gender pay gap in education.
290. The existence of the gender pay gap, and DfE lack of action in tackling it is a long-standing concern, stretching back over numerous years. As early as the 27<sup>th</sup> report, the Review Body had highlighted concerns about inequalities in the pay system, making clear that the DfE should undertake comprehensive analysis and monitoring to ensure that there are not discriminatory outcomes.<sup>107</sup>
291. In each subsequent year the Review Body has asked the Department to conduct further research that focuses and reports on the equality implications of the teachers' pay system.
292. It wasn't until 32<sup>nd</sup> remit round that the Department finally acquiesced to this request in a meaningful way by submitting *some initial* equalities analysis to the STRB. This found differences in pay progression and progression to the upper pay range for teachers with protected characteristics and part-time workers, and a pay gap between male and female teachers once leadership grades were included.
293. Despite the Department asserting that the analysis highlighted areas for further investigation or action, no further updates were provided for last year's remit, and no additional work has been conducted and shared publicly at the time of writing. This **shameful** dereliction of duty runs directly counter to the Review Body's calls for

'...detailed equality and inclusion data [to] be published annually as a **priority**."<sup>108</sup> [NAHT emphasis]

294. And despite the Department's assertions in their evidence submission to the 33<sup>rd</sup> remit that DfE '...wants teaching to be an inclusive profession where talented teachers from all backgrounds are supported throughout their careers',<sup>109</sup> NAHT sees no evidence of any 'commitment' to this in either the Department's work on pay, or its broader recruitment and retention strategy.

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<sup>106</sup> School workforce in England (2002 reporting year), DfE, 2023

<sup>107</sup> STRB 27<sup>th</sup> report, p65

<sup>108</sup> STRB 33<sup>rd</sup> report, 2023, p 1, 23 & 24

<sup>109</sup> Government evidence to the STRB, DfE, 2023, p 32

295. Aside from the numerous benefits to children and young people of having a diverse teaching profession (which the Department itself has acknowledged), this also highlights a potentially large pool of potential recruits into the profession which the Department is failing to even consider, despite the crisis in teacher and leadership supply.

296. These remain **urgent matters**, given the Department's longstanding failure to engage with, let alone make any meaningful progress in, tackling the gender pay gap, as detailed below.

## 5.2. Closing the Gender Pay Gap – 2023 update

297. As outlined above, NAHT, in partnership with ASCL, NGA and WomenEd conducted an analysis exploring the gender pay gap (the difference between the average pay rate for men and the average pay rate for women) in the English education system.

298. The resultant report, *Closing the gender pay gap in education: a leadership imperative*,<sup>110</sup> was intended to inform debate and highlight areas where action may be needed to ensure that women leaders and educators are valued appropriately and paid equitably for the work that they do.

299. Since the report's release in 2021, NAHT has provided an annual update to the analysis using the DfE's school workforce statistics to update our analysis, to track and changes and/or improvements.

300. For 2022/23 the average gender pay gap of across all state-funded schools was:


- £8181 in favour of male headteachers
- £3684 in favour of male 'other' leaders
- £1023 in favour of male classroom teachers.

301. Breaking this down at head teacher level, the chart below shows where the gender pay gap is the greatest, despite a slight closing of the gap in 2021/22 for heads in primary and nursery schools, the pay gap has since remained stubbornly static, at an average of **£2,181** in favour of males.

(Continued overleaf...)


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<sup>110</sup>[Closing the gender pay gap](#), NAHT, NGA, ASCL, WomenEd, 2021



Source: NAHT analysis of DfE workforce data<sup>111</sup>

302. In secondary schools, there has been continued growth in the pay gap between male and female head teachers. This year, for secondary heads, women earned on average **£3,908 less** than men, the **largest gap** in 12 years.



Source: NAHT analysis of DfE workforce data<sup>112</sup>

303. NAHT has repeatedly highlighted the consequences at an individual level can be severe. It is an established fact that the effect of pay disparity is compounded over time.


304. Earning, for example, 2% less than a male counterpart over a period of several years may not appear to be significant initially, but the cumulative effect is substantial. Over the course of a decades-long career this can amount to a large difference in overall earnings, with major implications not only for an individual's salary, but also their pension rights and entitlements, which we emphasise is deferred salary.

<sup>111</sup> Analysis of data contained in [School workforce in England](#) (2002 reporting year), DfE, 2023

<sup>112</sup> Analysis of data contained in [School workforce in England](#) (2002 reporting year), DfE, 2023

305. At head teacher level, across all types of state-funded schools, women tend to have steadier increases in salary by age, whereas men tend to see much larger increases, particularly towards the end of their career.

306. By the age of 60 this results in a **salary advantage for men of £15, 961**, which although below the peak a few years ago, continues to remain significant



Source: NAHT analysis of DfE workforce data<sup>113</sup>

307. NAHT has, once again, been unable to analyse the additional pay penalties that can face disabled women, and women from Black, Asian or minority ethnic backgrounds, because the DfE have **again failed** to publish sufficient data.

308. It is a matter of huge frustration that the continued limitations of the available data collected and published by DfE means it is not possible to analyse the impact and scale on pay equality of the interaction between gender and other protected characteristics, but research and evidence from other sectors suggests this is likely to be significant.

309. Given the above, NAHT believes that there is an urgent and incontestable need for the government to act without delay to conduct a detailed pay equality analysis for all protected characteristics.

### 5.3 Further considerations

310. In previous submissions NAHT, and other statutory consultees, have highlighted our concerns about the role **that performance-related pay progression** can play in creating and exacerbating pay gaps.

311. We recognise that it is the government's intention, following the helpful observations of the Review Body and the recommendations of the workload

<sup>113</sup> Analysis of data contained in [School workforce in England](#) (2002 reporting year), DfE, 2023

reduction taskforce, to remove PRP from September 2024.

312. While we hope that this welcome removal of PRP will assist in limiting and perhaps narrowing existing pay gaps, NAHT does not believe that this alone will resolve existing or future pay gap issues. Government must meet its equality duty by analysing tracking and tackling pay gaps, recognising and treating this as an area of core concern.

## 5.4 Targeting remuneration by subject

313. NAHT opposes salary differentiation by subject, phase or location.
314. Instead, government should focus on raising the profile, competitiveness and attractiveness of the profession as a whole. A major correction that 'lifts all boats' is needed to restore the relative and real terms value of pay. This should include:
- a reformed **national** pay structure with mandatory minimum pay points, and pay portability
  - a comprehensive review of the factors that determine leadership pay
  - a professional pay continuum that supports new career pathways and delivers pay progression for teachers and school leaders.
315. The notion that, for example, a physics teacher should receive higher pay than, say, a history or English teacher with equivalent experience for undertaking the same role would be widely regarded as divisive and offensive.
316. Equally, we oppose differentiating salaries according to the phase that a professional serves in. For example, paying a secondary teacher a higher salary than a primary teacher would serve to undermine applications to the primary phase and impact teacher quality. It would send an incorrect message about the value and worth of a primary professional.
317. Targeted pay fails to recognise the **complexity** and **interconnectedness** of the education system. At the most basic level this means that secondary teachers rely on the skills and effectiveness of the education provided by primary professionals, which underlay and underpin young people's achievement in the secondary phase.
318. Moreover, subject areas in a secondary school are not islands – the work of all teachers, including those with pastoral roles, and support staff, are critical to the whole. Placing a higher economic value on the work of one teacher rather than another on the basis of their subject qualification is simplistic and foolhardy. It fails to recognise the importance of the collective work of a school in the education of a child or young person.
319. There can be **no case** where it would be right for a secondary maths teacher to be paid more than a secondary politics teacher for teaching the same student a course of A level study that provides them access to a university degree level course.
320. Moreover, that student's success is not reliant solely on their A level teachers – their success is a product of teaching that has been received from key stage 1 onwards.

321. Throughout our evidence submission we have woven a thread which speaks to the **incoherence and ineffectiveness** of pay policies that seek to avoid tackling the key issues that act upon recruitment.
322. To reiterate: for far too long, instead of tackling the root causes of the supply crisis, ministers have focused on inconsequential or downright harmful policy programmes that fitted their worldview, rather than the evidence before them.
323. The truth is that the recruitment and retention crisis afflicts every part of the profession. A re-reading of the evidence above, containing detail about this year's recruitment to ITT, should make this abundantly clear.
324. The problem for the recruitment of secondary trainees is that too few graduates want to be a teacher under the prevailing pay and conditions; and many of those that do come into teaching ultimately find that they are dissatisfied with those prevailing conditions too, and quit.
325. This issue is not a problem in recruiting physics or business study teachers – **it's the inability to recruit and retain sufficient teachers, full stop.**
326. Primary recruitment is **also** failing. Note carefully that even a 21% cut in the primary ITT target last year could not prevent primary ITT failing to recruit sufficient teachers for the second year in a row. The solution is clearly not to respond to that failure by paying primary teachers less than their secondary counterparts.
327. Since 2010, government has failed to secure sufficient teachers. Numerous policy initiatives have had no impact at all. In 2024 the supply crisis extends across the whole profession in both phases from teacher training to leadership. Matters are so serious that government now thinks it is a necessary and *acceptable* to fill the gaps by potentially placing 18-year-olds without a degree into a classroom to train to teach.
328. Targeted pay would carry with it a huge range of unintended consequences and perverse incentives. What is needed is a major correction on pay to restore its relative and real value. There must also be action to remove workload, which in the long run is contingent on there being more staff in our schools. There must be action on the ill health outcomes driven by an unsafe, broken inspection and accountability system.
329. A look at **bursaries** gives a sense of the mess that pursuing differentiated pay models is likely to create. In our commentary above we have indicated deep concerns about possible **equalities** consequences that may accompany such a course, and particularly the impact on the pay of female workers who are both disproportionately over and underrepresented in different parts of the education system.
330. A cursory consideration of the latest recruitment data for the gender split among Mathematics, Computing and Physics trainees, subjects where there is sometimes a case made for additional 'market payments', reveals that any




differential payments would overwhelmingly benefit male applicants who far outweigh female applicants.

Subject	Bursary	Scholarship	Female Candidates	Male Candidates	Difference female to male
<b>Computing</b>	£28,000	£30,000	541	1176	<b>-635</b>
<b>Maths</b>	£28,000	£30,000	2473	3361	<b>-888</b>
<b>Physics</b>	£28,000	£30,000	810	2101	<b>-1291</b>

Source: Initial teacher training census, DfE, 2023<sup>114</sup>

331. The charts below emphasise gender inequalities within the distribution of the current bursary schemes:




Source: NAHT analysis of DfE Initial teacher training census, DfE, 2023<sup>115</sup>

(Continued overleaf...)

<sup>114</sup> Initial teacher training census, DfE, 2023

<sup>115</sup> Initial teacher training census, DfE, 2023



Source: NAHT analysis of DfE Initial teacher training census, DfE, 2023<sup>116</sup>

332. NFER’s recent highly theoretical work examining a range of pay options and scenarios, including, various forms of so-called ‘flattening’, ‘targeting’ and other forms of differentiated pay, recognises that such approaches would increase further unfairness into the pay system, be likely to increase the gender pay gap and may also undermine the quality of applicants to job roles where salaries are disadvantaged by differential pay policies.<sup>117</sup>
333. NFER’s study is silent on the implications of the specific need for government to meet its public sector equality duty, by examining **all** of the possible impacts on those with protected characteristics as a **precursor** to any policy inception.
334. Statute requires the design of any future pay system to be designed to meet government’s public sector equality duty. Failing to design and test a pay system to ensure that it does not **discriminate** against those with protected characteristics will undoubtedly expose it to the likelihood of successful legal challenge.
335. Before any proposals are made, there **must be** a ‘first principles’ equalities impact assessment to inform any policy development. There may be further considerations to be taken into account on age, ethnicity and other characteristics.
336. NAHT is deeply concerned that beginnings of policy proposals around differential pay and pay targeting have not been adequately discussed on even a ‘first principles’ basis with statutory consultees. We are clear that any changes to the pay structure must be the product of full consultation, collaboration and negotiations with representative trade unions.

<sup>116</sup> Initial teacher training census, DfE, 2023

<sup>117</sup> Policy options for a long-term teacher pay and financial incentive strategy, NFER, July 2023, p 22

337. There is certainly a case for a new parliament to engage, collaborate and negotiate over the development of a long-term strategy to increase pay and incentives, that will also deliver vastly improved working conditions.
338. In order to resolve the teacher and school leader supply crisis, it is imperative to create a positive proposition that will attract recent graduates and potential career changers to commit to pursuing a professional career in teaching.
339. Central to the re-positioning of teaching as a long-term professional occupation is the development of an effective pay structure. Pay must provide a basis for the recognition of experience, progression, additional responsibility and leadership. We urge the STRB to recognise that teachers' and leaders' pay are intrinsically connected, forming a critical part of the **career continuum**.
340. The vision should be of a **decades-long** career in education with clear career and salary progression points, and flexible, and sustainable career pathways that are underpinned by appropriate opportunities for funded training and development.
341. NAHT has been consistent and clear about the initial steps that should be taken. What's required is:
- a reformed national pay structure with mandatory minimum pay points, and pay portability
  - a comprehensive review of the factors that determine leadership pay
  - a professional pay continuum that supports new career pathways and delivers pay progression for teachers and school leaders
  - codification of executive leadership roles within a revised STPCD, and inclusion or alignment of school business leader roles within the leadership pay range
  - comprehensive analysis of the gender pay gap and determined actions to eliminate pay gaps for all protected characteristics to ensure pay equality and equity
  - protected leadership time for assistant and deputy head teachers, and head teachers of small schools
  - promotion of genuinely flexible approaches to working, such as phased retirement options
  - establishment of a range of 'key worker' packages
  - a system that delivers timely pay uplifts
  - commitment to full funding of future pay uplifts

- a statement on reasonably expected working hours for leaders

342. **In the interim, the 2024 pay round** must deliver a major correction to teaching professionals' pay through an undifferentiated, fully funded uplift to all salaries and allowances in payment from September 2024.

343. To be effective this uplift **must**:

- improve the competitiveness of teaching professionals' pay against earnings in the wider economy by delivery an uplift **higher** than average pay settlements across the whole economy.

**and**

- be **higher** than the annual CPI inflation rate recorded for 2023 of 7.3% (unless monthly measures of inflation rise above this level between now and September)

**and**

- contain an additional element to begin restoration of the real terms value of teachers' and school leaders' pay against losses the caused by below inflation uplifts since 2010.